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Introduction 
The late 1950s and early 1960s served as a catalytic moment in modern African history. 
For the first time since colonialization, African nations were nominally sovereign, and 
postcolonial governments began a wave of development projects and state expansion. In the 
years since that initial wave of independence, historians have critiqued many of the most 
ambitious projects of early African independence as unresponsive to the needs of local 
populations. In most instances these histories serve as honest appraisals of complicated policy 
failures and the normatively damaging effects of state violence. However, simply identifying 
when states or international actors used coercive power or active neglect to subjugate communal 
knowledge or desires is not enough to understand the potential of African states. For a more 
robust historical analysis, it is also necessary to understand contexts in which the work of the 
state intersected at least somewhat positively with the interests of both a general populace and 
particularly marginalized subgroups. My intention is to tell one history of a complicated but 
constructive state action by examining the case of education in post-colonial Tanzanian through 
the end of the 20th century. Education stands out as both a forgotten component of discourse 
around Tanzanian politics and as a generative location in understanding the relationship between 
state development and human rights.  
The value of interrogating Tanzania stems both from its distinctive postcolonial politics, 
including the state’s particular investment in education, and understanding that politics beings 
with a having a basic timeline of the Tanzanian state. During the colonial period, Tanzania was 
originally overseen by Germany and transferred to Britain after World War I. The Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU) led Tanzania to independence in 1961 under the socialist vision 
of Julius Nyerere. In the late 60s and early 70s, the nation’s leaders accelerated Ujamaa, 
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Nyerere’s particular collectivist vision of uniquely African socialism, but a severe economic 
collapses tempered their most far-reaching ambitions. By the late 1980s, the state abandoned 
most of its most ambitious socialist goals as it disinvested from social goods under the terms of a 
structural adjustment program.  When Tanzania eventually stabilized in the 90s, a new 
generation of political leaders mothballed the original socialist goals of early independence in 
favor of further political and economic liberalization, which has continued into the present. 
This political context has been extensively explored in evolving waves of scholarly 
interest.  In Tanzania’s first decade, there was an excitement among many Western radical 
scholars about the potential of the Tanzanian state’s commitment to egalitarian growth, and a 
few even went to Tanzania to teach at the University of Dar es Salaam. Many of these academics 
viewed Nyerere as a visionary political leader with a unique interest in serving as an intellectual 
and global public thinker.1 The larger development community, including scholars, international 
government bureaucrats, and professionals in the field, shared some of the optimism this 
generated, though with a greater amount of doubt about the feasibility of Tanzania’s goals. After 
the political acceleration of the 70s, economic collapses of the 80s, and eventual pivot of the 90s, 
the consensus around Tanzania’s past socialist state politics is muddled. Traditional development 
economists have criticized their enormous state expenditures, political theorists have pointed out 
the socialist state’s coercive use of power against its constituent populace, and historians have 
pointed out the exclusion of various communities from Tanzania’s created identities.2  Susan 
Gieger, for example, has complicated the masculine narrative of the independence process, while 
                                                          
1 Ali Mazrui, "Tanzaphilia" Transition 31 (1967): 20-26. 
2 James C. Scott, Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed, Yale 
University Press, 1998 
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even more recently Emily Callaci has interrogated how urban populations inhabited space within 
Tanzania’s explicitly rural-oriented politics.3  
This wide interest in reinterpreting Tanzanian politics and policies is valuable but, in a 
particular way, it has occasionally suffered from a myopic lens of analysis. Ujamaa was used to 
describe the general ideology of Nyerere’s and TANU’s African socialism, but it is also often a 
more specific shorthand for the villagization projects that Nyerere advocated for as part of 
collectivizing the state, Ujamaa Vijijini. This project began initially as voluntary resettlement but 
movement into the new village structures created by the state was eventually encouraged with 
force before failing completely.4 Because of the structural importance of villagization to Ujamaa, 
the failures and contradictions of attempts at population resettlement into village units has been 
mapped onto the entirety of Tanzania’s state socialism. This slippage between Ujamaa as a larger 
ideological project and Ujamaa as a program villagization reveals some valuable truths about the 
Tanzanian state, but also obscures other sources of TANU’s appeal. This includes advancements 
in expanding health care, maintaining internal peace, and rapidly expanding education. 
Reframing the history of Tanzania through the lens of education cannot fully represent the 
relationship of the Tanzanian state with the populace or the contributions of the Tanzanian 
context to global debates about development or rights. It can, however, demonstrate a more 
productive version of modernist state projects as well as illuminate the germane tensions 
between frameworks of rights and development.  
                                                          
3 Susan Geiger, "Tanganyikan nationalism as ‘women's work’: Life histories, collective biography and changing 
historiography," The Journal of African History 37, no. 3 (1996): 465-478. 
Emily Callaci, Ujamaa Urban: Street Archives and City Life in Socialist Tanzania, Duke University Press Books, 2017 
4 Scott, 224. 
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During the same time span that villagization struggled to gain traction among the general 
populace and eventually metastasized into forced resettlement, education flourished in Tanzania, 
despite a tepid colonial antecedent. Under German colonialism there were some educational 
opportunities, but all of them were meant to teach needed vocational skills to the indigenous 
collaborators.5 Though this training was lauded for effectively preparing local peoples for 
economies of extraction, no great attention was given to including precolonial methods of 
learning or creating opportunities for learning outside of skills like German tax collection.6 When 
the British took over, they considered Tanzania something of a backwater and initially paid little 
attention to creating schools or literacy programs.  
British and German missionaries created a handful of mission schools that provided 
slightly more expansive educational opportunities, but they were woefully under-resourced to 
provide schooling for any significant portion of the indigenous population.7 Missionary 
reformers also created secondary schools and job opportunities for a small number of educated 
Tanzanians as teachers, but even those attempts were limited and unstable. Starting in the 1940’s 
with the return of soldiers from World War II, Tanzanians began to push for more a more robust 
education system through letters to colonial governors, repeated petitions to the British state, and 
verbal discontent. Eventually, the British government tried to fulfill some of these demands by 
planning to build new schools and creating a more diverse curriculum, but local colonial 
administrators thwarted most of these efforts, likely out of concern about ceding authority to 
                                                          
5 Juhani Koponen, "Development For Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania 1884-1914." VRÜ 
Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 29, no. 4 (1996): 504-506. 
6John Iliffe, 211,1979, A Modern History of Tanganyika, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
7 White, Bob W. "Talk about School: education and the colonial project in French and British Africa (1860-
1960)." Comparative Education 32, no. 1 (1996): 9-26. 
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possible African replacements.8  Tanzanians would have to build the education system they 
demanded themselves.   
After independence, schooling was integrated and widely expanded under the new state, 
and unlike with resettlement, available sources suggest that education projects enjoyed 
significant popularity among most Tanzanians. Many of the gains extended across lines of 
gender, race, ethnicity, and religion. Even after the end of villagization, the impact of economic 
recession on education and the revamping of education in the 90’s mapped the continuing 
legacies of Ujamaa in ways villagization no longer could. Further, while education was not as 
physically linked to the execution of Ujamaa as resettlement, it was always a central part of 
Nyerere’s and TANU’s political philosophy. Nyerere was deeply engaged in reforming and 
expanding education in Tanzania, and he understood universal public education as a foundational 
part of ensuring prosperity and egalitarianism in Tanzania. This importance stemmed both from 
the economic value of teaching workforce skills and the greater autonomy enabled by literacy 
and structured critical thinking.9 Doing so required substantially restructuring the colonial 
system, and significant buy in from even the poorest peasant communities. In education, many of 
the groups that had been relegated to the subaltern, like young women or poor and unskilled 
laborers, found common ground with the state in creating new pathways to greater agency. This 
occasionally involved ignoring the state’s intentions in providing educational opportunities.   
Beyond allowing for a better understanding of Tanzania’s socialist project as it was 
negotiated between the state and population, historicizing postcolonial Tanzanian education also 
suggests the kind of insights that engaging with alternative projects of problematic African states 
                                                          
8 Andreas Eckert, "Regulating the social: social security, social welfare and the state in late colonial Tanzania." The 
Journal of African History 45, no. 3 (2004): 467-489. 
9Julius K Nyerere, "Education for self‐reliance," The Ecumenical Review 19, no. 4 (1967): 382-403 
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might produce. Understanding Tanzania’s commitment to education as sincere and significant, if 
strategically deployed, includes accepting the sincerity of the dual justification of education 
expenditures as both protecting a universal right and enabling greater economic development. 
The friction Tanzania experienced between the two frameworks is instructive in understanding 
how validating a good as an immutable right is at odds with simultaneously understanding it as a 
conditional investment in financial growth on a global scale. If a social service, like education, is 
a good then it cannot be subject to the same cycle of volatility in commitment that conditional 
investments are. In the crucible of poverty and anti-colonial politics, the Tanzanian government 
created an education system in the 60s that threaded the narrow limits of development while 
maintaining a commitment to egalitarianism that was radically expanded into the late 70s. That 
the system buckled under structural adjustment programs in the 80s and was eventually 
restructured as primarily a tool of development in the 90s reflects more than Tanzania’s internal 
politics. It suggests that, despite its global prevalence, the discourse of rights remains secondary 
to the hegemonic and coercive power of development-oriented ideologies. Even state projects 
responsive to the desires and rights of its populace are at risk of being consumed by the 
corrupting influences of international financial coercion and a global tendency towards 
authoritarian state rule.  
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Chapter 1 
Independence Thinkers: Building Education 1954 to 1967  
Since its inception as an independent nation, Tanzania - or Tanganyika - has had leaders 
interested in the place of education in a democratic nation.10 After assuming control of their own 
education system, Tanzanian people capitalized on the existing language of global rights and 
education emerged as a primary concern of post-independence political discourse. Tanzanian 
thinkers generatively added to that discourse, espousing a vision of education that accounted for 
the way in which economic instability changes the capacity of states to provide to provide 
education without reducing the necessity of educational opportunities. This early Tanzanian 
context also serves a reminder of the ways in which national education systems served as 
locations of transnational influence in which local interests interacted with international intrigue 
and politics. Tanzania does not represent a utopic education system for poor nations or a 
monolithic resonance across the global south, but it does serve as an effective reminder that the 
ideals of post-independence African states were not entirely a failed dream.  
Tanzania’s particular understanding of post-independence education is also helpful in 
understanding the possible limits of using both rights and development discourses 
simultaneously and interchangeably and the limits of a supposedly benevolent international 
network of development agencies and NGOs. Gaining these insights starts with understanding 
the education system of an independent Tanzania. From the start of independence through the 
early 1970s, Tanzania prioritized education among its political commitments and the education 
                                                          
10 Tanganyika, in this case and on later reference, refers to what is now the mainland of Tanzania. The island 
territory of Zanzibar was separately governed at the time, and continues to operate under a separate education 
policy.   
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system rapidly expanded both in length of coursework and number of students while breaking 
down preexisting racial barriers. Tanzanian leaders justified these efforts both on the basis of 
economic development and human rights, a mix that would have later consequences.  In the 
process, they generated an important case study in human rights, poverty reduction, 
development, and state cohesion.11 Understanding the lessons of the modern Tanzanian 
education system starts with an afternoon in the capital city of Dar es Salaam in the summer of 
1954.   
The Beginning of Tanzania 
That afternoon, July 7th 1954 at 4:30pm to be precise, 16 men, representatives of various 
branch offices and their general organization president Julius Nyerere, sat down for the 
beginning of a national meeting of the Tanganyikan African Association.12 It would later come 
to be known as the first conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union.13 After an 
opening prayer, the men discussed the rather banal matter of a telegram that had been sent by a 
regional office without the national association’s consent. This dialogue lasted until the meeting 
adjourned for the day at 2 am.14  The next day, starting at 9 am, the group began work in earnest. 
After voting to record minutes and recognize the registration of all branches present, the 
organization began to reshape entire its function.15  
                                                          
11 Kaiser, Paul J. "Structural adjustment and the fragile nation: the demise of social unity in Tanzania." The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 34, no. 2 (1996): 227-237. 
Obiakor, Festus E. "Building patriotic African leadership through African-centered education." Journal of Black 
Studies34, no. 3 (2004): 402-420. 
12 Pamphlets, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library. Minutes of the First Conference of the 
Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 
13 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 2. 
14 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 3. 
15 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 3 
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They started by renaming the Tanganyikan African Association the Tanganyikan African 
National Union (TANU).16 This shift served as a statement of purpose for what the organization 
would become. In the past it had served as a glorified social club mostly composed of 
bureaucrats with a muted political impact. Even at its most radical it only obliquely suggested 
that Africans in the Tanganyikan Trusteeship might have other authority structures outside the 
chief system supported by the British Empire. In its new iteration, younger more radical voices 
gained greater sway and organizers began to create a more economically diverse base of 
supporters.17 This new entity, TANU, would be a fully-fledged political body, intended to 
represent the interests of the people of Tanganyika.  
Next, the newly formed TANU collectively agreed to push forward the fight to make the 
Legislative Council of Tanganyika, the primary legislative body of the territory, an elected body 
rather than one appointed by the Governor and to make Kiswahili the second language of the 
Legislative Council.18 They then engaged in a debate about what the make-up of the Legislative 
Council would ideally be. The agreed upon proposal was one in which the three races of 
Tanzania (White, Asian, and African) would each be represented by nine legislative council 
members. The primary point of conflict during that discussion was that many on the council felt 
that in the future Africans should have a larger portion of the Legislative Council membership 
given that they were both the majority in Tanganyika and the original inhabitants.19 It was at this 
point, having only established that their organization should be renamed and support a 
democratic multi-racial Tanganyika that the group turned to the issue of education.  
                                                          
16 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 3 
17 John Iliffe, 1979, A Modern History of Tanganyika, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
18 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 4. 
19 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 4. 
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That education took precedence just after democracy at the very first conference of 
TANU should serve to highlight just how important an issue it was to leading Tanganyikan 
political leaders, especially Julius Nyerere, a former teacher who would use the honorific for 
teachers, Mwalimu, until he died.20 Education was undeniably a primary policy concern of 
Tanganyikan leaders when they were aspiring democrats. Many saw it as embedded in the 
process of greater African autonomy, the most important priority, and believed it took 
precedence over economic growth and development.21 Education would continue to be a core 
value and policy focus when Tanganyikan organizers turned toward calling for independence and 
when they eventually took over the government themselves. During that July 8th meeting many 
of hopes and goals that Tanganyikans, and later Tanzanians, had for their country found their 
first expression. The committee first agreed that education should be both universal and 
compulsory because at the time the majority of African children were not formally schooled.22  
Achieving universal and compulsory education would go on to be the central struggle of 
Tanganyikan education policy. Aside from that priority, the group also discussed the need to 
extend the length of primary school, improve the quality of middle school, and to provide more 
trade school options for those interested in them. As with the legislature, it was determined that 
Kiswahili should be prioritized in primary schools. The national organization appointed a sub-
committee of four led by TANU President Julius Nyerere to go around the country collecting 
donations for education that could not be spent anywhere else.23  This mandate reflected the 
popularity of education among the diverse range of a Asian, African and White Tanganyikan 
                                                          
20 Goran Hyden, "Mao and Mwalimu: The soldier and the teacher as revolutionary." Transition 34 (1967): 24-30. 
21 John Iliffe, 574, 1979, A Modern History of Tanganyika, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
22 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 5 
23 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 5. 
14 
 
communities TANU was hoping to consolidate popularity in.24 From the very beginning of an 
independent Tanganyikan political conscious, Tanganyikans prioritize education both 
ideologically and practically, an education in which “all the people should equally share.”25 
Early Steps towards Independence 
While all of the proposals discussed at the time of the first conference would eventually 
become law in some form, these seeds of education policy would take years to sprout as 
Tanganyikans organized and prepared for independence. This was a burdensome process, but 
one that they were able to navigate with greater ease than many of their neighbors. Only about a 
year after the creation of TANU, Nyerere was the first African to present to the Tanganyika 
Trustee Council, an institution headquartered in New York and created in 1923 under a UN 
mandate after the British took possession of German colonial holdings. Speaking on behalf of 
“his people’s hopes and fears”, Nyerere discussed a wide range of topics. 26 In a sense, this early 
meeting was a dress rehearsal for the full complexity of later independence negotiations. Despite 
the wide range of concerns impeding that eventual goal, the one topic both Nyerere and the 
Trusteeship Council kept coming back to was education.   
This interest started with questions about a rhetorical flourish. Throughout his career, 
Nyerere would often say that the three enemies of Tanzania that must be fought with 
development were ignorance, disease, and poverty -- a line that is still used in Tanzanian 
political parlance. At this early meeting, he had only developed the phrase to include ignorance 
and poverty, but one of the committee members, Mr. Jaipal of India, took note of Nyerere’s 
                                                          
24 John Iliffe, 449, 1979, A Modern History of Tanganyika, New York, Cambridge University Press 
25 Minutes of the First Conference of the Tanganyikan African National Union, 7-8 July 1954, 7. 
26 Pamphlets, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, TANU Katika UNO, Hearing of the 
Representative of the Tanganyikan African Union, TANU 1955, pg. 27  
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repeated uses of the nomenclature nonetheless.  When questioned by Jaipal about what he saw as 
the solution to ignorance, Nyerere responded that because there was a “great demand for 
education in the country,” among both boys and girls, but not enough resources to fulfill the 
demand, he saw the immediate solution as more “school education.”27 In a dual argument that he 
would repeat in different iterations for the rest of his career, he further argued that education 
would both help Tanganyika escape a subsistence level life style and would help Tanganyikans 
become better more fulfilled people, as it had him.28 These educated workers would then feed 
into the collaborative markets of African co-ops that Nyerere would come to use as the 
foundation of his economic Ujama philosophy.29 Here again, as Nyerere sought to position 
Tanganyika as a more independent nation he imagined education as both an end undo itself and 
the engine that would drive economic success.  
 This self-reliant model was necessary partially because of the nation’s poverty but also 
because, as Nyerere would point out to the committee, TANU had no way of becoming a 
governing party at the time given existing laws against political organizing.30 Perhaps the most 
telling part of the entire presentation was not one directly about education. After affirming 
TANU’s belief in the non-racial education to the Syrian committee member, Nyerere was asked 
about Tanganyika’s need to develop to capital by an American, Mr. Sears. Juilius Nyerere, a man 
who would later come to be known as the father of African Socialism, did not immediately 
launch into a discussion of wealth and economics or even of agricultural development. Instead he 
                                                          
27 Pamphlets, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, TANU Katika UNO, Hearing of the 
Representative of the Tanganyikan African Union, TANU 1955, pg. 52. 
28 Pamphlets, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, TANU Katika UNO, Hearing of the 
Representative of the Tanganyikan African Union, TANU 1955, pg. 52. 
29 Eckert, Andreas. "Useful instruments of participation? Local government and cooperatives in Tanzania, 1940s to 
1970s." The International journal of African historical studies 40, no. 1 (2007): 97-118. 
30 Pamphlets, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, TANU Katika UNO, Hearing of the 
Representative of the Tanganyikan African Union, TANU 1955, pg., 55. 
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agreed that the economic problems could be particularly vexing because of the need for technical 
knowledge to solve them. He located the answer to these problems in learning new technologies, 
and he compared the difficulty economic problems to the relative ease of political ones. In 
politics what was needed was “merely to sit down and think out the problems.”31 Given an easy 
opportunity to lay the foundation for his, later infamous, villagization schemes or theories of 
economic socialism, Nyerere prioritized education as both a right and salvation from economic 
woes. As he understood it, education was key to ideological questions, and it was even more 
important for technical ones. This suggests the depth and danger of early prioritizations of 
education as a focal point of independence. Education as a right would also be expected to create 
economic development through centralized state action.   
The Beginning of Tanzanian Education 
This initial meeting became the foundation for a transition to self-governance that was 
eased along by the specter of the more violent independence fight in neighboring Kenya, the 
unique trusteeship status of Tanganyika that provided a forum both for TANU’s representatives 
and sympathetic UN officials, and Nyerere’s own personal charisma.32 While still not 
independent, Tanganyika held elections for the first time in 1958, and TANU claimed a majority 
of seats in the legislative council.33 By the end of 1958, the first year of TANU legislative 
majority, the legislature formed a committee to review the existing education system, and to 
make recommendations for integrating the four racially separate education systems” within 
                                                          
31 Pamphlets, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, TANU Katika UNO, Hearing of the 
Representative of the Tanganyikan African Union, TANU 1955, pg. 76. 
32 Miguel, Edward. "Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." World politics 56, 
no. 3 (2004): 327-362. 
33 John Iliffe, 517-518, 1979, A Modern History of Tanganyika, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
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existing financial provisions, African, European, Indian, and the miniscule other non-native 
system.34 After working for a year and receiving memoranda from organizations including a 
range of parent associations and the national teachers union, the Committee on the Integration of 
Education published its report in October of 1959.35  
The report outlined both the stark inequality that defined colonial education systems and 
provided a set of recommendations. It started with a brief accounting for the state of education 
prior to any change.36  While almost any non-African with an interest in primary education was 
able to find a spot, only 44% of eligible African Tanganyikans could even enter primary school. 
This was only exacerbated in higher levels of education and by the end of middle school the 
African population enrolled in the grade level population dwindled from 110,330 students in the 
first year of primary school all the way down to 7,503 student, 6.8% of the already small number 
of enrolled primary students.37 Non-African students also received their school funding from a 
special account rather than the general allocation process that African schools were beholden to 
which meant that their funding level was both higher and more stable.  To change this the 
committee proposed 26 recommendations which sought to address inequalities with minimally 
radical change.38  
                                                          
34East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, Committee on the Integration on the Integration of 
Education,  Report of the Committee on the Integration on the Integration of Education, 1960, Government 
Printer, Dar es Salaam 
35 Committee on the Integration on the Integration of Education,  Report of the Committee on the Integration on 
the Integration of Education, 1960, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam 
36 Committee on the Integration on the Integration of Education,  Report of the Committee on the Integration on 
the Integration of Education, 1960, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam 
37 Committee on the Integration on the Integration of Education,  Report of the Committee on the Integration on 
the Integration of Education, 1960, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam 
38 Committee on the Integration on the Integration of Education,  Report of the Committee on the Integration on 
the Integration of Education, 1960, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam 
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Mostly comprised of technical details about examination regulations or funding 
mechanism, these 26 proposals largely amounted to merging the various Tanganyikan systems, 
erasing their racial distinctions, and standardizing instruction and funding. A few proposals of 
note outside of the more technical notations included a recommendation that Swahili-language 
primary schools not pay tuition from which two members dissented, the only dissentions in the 
report. There was also a recommendation that further planning of the new system be done 
regionally, a proposal that governments help fund those privately created schools that fit the new 
standards, and a possible timeline under which the suggestions would be implemented the first 
day of 1962.39  These proposals helped establish that any new education system would have to 
take seriously the concerns of African Tanganyikans, that, though controversial, Swahili would 
be the prioritized language, and that the input of the general populace would have great 
importance, both through the localized governing bodies and the ability to create new schools 
when needed.   
Much of this promise soon came to partial fruition with the passage of corresponding 
legislation. Though Tanzania was still not independent in 1959 when the report was published, 
TANU has again been elected with a majority in the legislative council and in 1960 Julius 
Nyerere was elected Chief Minister.40  Under Nyerere’s guidance, an education ordinance was 
passed on October 30th of 1961 that followed the recommendations of the committee with a few 
added provision.41 The new law made clear that students could not be discriminated against for 
                                                          
39 Committee on the Integration on the Integration of Education,  Report of the Committee on the Integration on 
the Integration of Education, 1960, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam 
40 John Iliffe, 1979, 523, A Modern History of Tanganyika, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
41 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, Tanganyika National Assembly, October 30th 1961 
An Ordinance to make provision for a Single System of Education in the Territory,  Tanganyika  Gazette, Dar es 
Salaam 
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their race or religion.42 This was meant to both undermine racialized class hierarchies, and to 
prevent the marginalization of Christian and Muslim minorities in largely religious homogenous 
regions of the country.43 It also gave the Minister of Education the authority, though not the 
responsibility, to make primary education compulsory.44 Compulsory education might seem like 
a coercive measure, but it was conceptualized as an emancipatory provision for students whose 
parents might seek to prevent them from going to school and was ultimately not enacted under 
this initial ordinance. Finally, it also created a registry of schools to which school owners could 
apply in order to recognized and possibly funded by the government, without which an 
institution was not allowed to call itself a school.45 This last reform would be the mechanism 
through which churches, municipalities, or civic organizations could create their own new 
schools. Schools were rarely unable to be listed, and the government funding mechanism 
allowed communities to create schools that could then be funded and eventually expanded by the 
government. 
The ordinance’s reforms were the first tangible realization of TANU’s idea that 
Tanganyika’s education system should serve as both an economic tool and an intrinsic good for 
all citizens without discrimination. Less than two months later, after years of slow political 
escalation, Tanganyika gained full independence on December 9th, 1961. The Education 
Ordinance of 1961 did not take effect until January 1st 1962, and was passed by a legislative 
body and leader chosen by the people of Tanganyika. In this sense, it was both the first education 
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law of independence, and a reminder that education could be a building block for a new 
Tanganyika, intended for all regardless of race or creed. As Oscar Kambona noted in his first 
parliamentary speech one year earlier Tangayika was a “far reaching experiment to show the 
world the races can live in harmony.”46 This description of Tanzania as a model for the world 
carried particular weight because Kambona was one of the most important Tanganyikan 
politicians and at the time served as Minister of Education.  Before independence, Kambona had 
been one of the leading figures in organizing support for TANU, and he most prominently served 
later as Foreign Minister, at various points surpassed only by Nyerere in power and popularity.47 
In that first speech to the assembly, Kambona also made sure to note that almost every member 
of the legislative body had brought up education in their speeches. As he further pointed out, this 
first generation of Tanzanian leaders was disproportionately comprised of teachers.48 As a group, 
hey not only had benefited from education, but had actively participated in its provision.  
Even aside from the demographic background of Tanganyikan leaders, these reforms at 
the beginning of independence defined the structural function of schooling for years. The 
commitment to removing race from education was the core of an effort by Tanganyikan leaders 
to frame the newly formed nation as an egalitarian community where race, ethnicity, and religion 
were not divisive issues. This narrative certainly fit the needs of an aspirational one party 
government, but it also spoke to a utopian vision of harmony.49  In some sense the scale of 
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change was underrepresented by the committees report because it took for granted some of the 
grassroots change, local organizing, and legislative modification that TANU had been doing to 
shift the issue. However, these reforms were not especially radical, and came far from satisfying 
the desires of the party, people, and parliament.  Tanganyika was a particularly poor African 
nation with significant dearth of even enough educated professionals to fill schools as teachers.50 
Education was beginning to be talked about in universal terms as a right, but the dream of 
universal and compulsory education was a distant aspiration. In order to begin to bridge the gap 
between their aspirations and reality Tanganyikans would have to rely on external aid and the 
advice that came with it. 
Foreign Aid and Abet  
As an exiting colonial power, the British had plenty of advice and some aid to give, but 
Tanzania’s condemnation of British involvement in Rhodesia in 1965 caused a steep reduction in 
their unilateral aid.51 That same year, West German aid was complicated by Tanzania’s 
insistence on close relationship with East German.52 In the absence of ample aid from colonial 
powers, Tanzania’s path to external development aid ran through diversified unilateral 
relationships and the growing multilateral international development community. No singular 
example or road map existed for negotiating this reality. The Marshall Plan, an American-led 
project to rebuild Western Europe in the wake of World War II, acted as the first project of 
modern international development, but newly independent African states of the 1960s, like 
Tanganyika, were the first staging ground for creating a codified global process of 
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development.53 Both international educational governmental bodies, like UNESCO, and 
international financial institutions, like the IMF, had been created in the 1940s, but only after the 
wave of African independence would their functions being to resemble that of their modern 
iterations. Similarly, during the 1960s civic societies and progressive social circles in Europe and 
the U.S. were just beginning to expand a now well-established global network of development 
NGOs. Most development NGOs saw their function as providing a boost of aid through short 
term projects that would allow poor countries to overcome deficits in capital, technology and 
knowledge. 54 The implicit value structure of this mission and its possible long term 
consequences had yet to be robustly interrogated.  
While nominally these organizations, institutions, and the network of nations that ran 
them were primarily invested in Tanganyika’s wellbeing and future prosperity, fissures quickly 
became clear between the future that Tanganyikans perceived  as best for their country and what 
the international community thought was most prudent. Some of the earliest signs of this can be 
seen in the 1962 UNESCO Educational Planning Missions report on Tanganyika published in 
January of 1963.55 As the report was being written, Tanganyika was wrapping up its first year of 
both independence and its newly reformed education system. The report members documented 
this and congratulated Tanganyika on prioritizing a singular development goal rather than a 
range of programs when the 1961-1964 development plan for Tanganyika posited that the single 
greatest need for the “country’s development” was the “considerable expansion of secondary 
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education.”56 The report further provided useful information on the possibility of teacher 
shortfalls and, in a prescient comment, made clear that “aid [was] essential.”57  
However, in their recommendation the UNESCO board members also made clear that 
they saw education not as a fundamental human right but as a complicated economic calculation, 
reflecting the trickle-down model implicit in early aid.58 They explicitly prefaced their list of 
primary recommendations with a statement that they worked under the “economic premise” that 
education would be a tool of “developing and administering the country” and thus all other uses, 
such as advancing “culture,” should be ignored.59 They also made clear that their vision included 
a distinctly un-egalitarian system of education, uninterested in the values described by TANU 
leaders since the creation of TANU. Charging fees for school was “to be encouraged,” ensuring 
that the poorest Tanganyikans would be unable to access this new learning.60 Part time schooling 
that enabled children from working families to still attend school was “highly undesirable” and 
would not be “tolerable” in the future.61 Perhaps most egregiously, it was explicitly stated that 
“emphasis should be placed on boy’s education.”62 This argument was justified on the perceived 
higher economic value boys generated from the cost of their education. In contrast to the 
discourse of Africa’s pre-modernity, often reinforced by bodies like UNESCO, Tanganyika was 
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more committed to the education of women than the international agencies and development 
charities “guiding” them. More broadly, though, this language of education as primarily an 
economic tool would later begin to infect the discourse of Tangayikan politics.  
Despite the contradictions of such necessary associations, Tanganyika’s relationship with 
external donors was generally not confrontational and the education system maintained a general 
stasis during early independence. For the most part, during the early independence period of the 
early to mid-60s Tanganyika continued to simply find its footing as new nation. The 1964-1967 
Development Plan was much the same as the first, lauding the expansion of secondary education 
and relying on the generosity of external donors.63 The nation tried to broadly follow a middle 
path in the Cold War where TANU endorsed a gentle vision of socialism utilizing communal 
“self-help” as a primary political and development ideology.64 Over those early years Zanzibar 
joined Tanganyika as semi-autonomous region, with a separate education system, creating 
Tanzania. Despite a few instances of political intrigue, rioting, and a brief retreat of Nyerere 
from the government, Tanzania remained relatively stable. However, few structural or systematic 
changes were made to overhaul the preexisting political and economic reality. TANU still had 
yet to accomplish, or even truly set many of the goals it had set for itself, and the path forward 
seemed somewhat murky under an ideologically mixed socialism. That moderation with the 
release of an TANU policy document, “The Arusha Declaration,” in 1967 as well as series of 
companion documents written by Nyerere himself, most notably the widely read “Socialism for 
Rural Development” and “Education for Self Reliance.65” 
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Tanzania Starts a Radical Shift 
The Arusha Declaration was short, but it provided the missing ideological mandate for 
TANU as a governing party of Tanzania and included a more fleshed realization of education as 
both a right and an economic tool. On a structural level, it codified the formal creation of a one 
party political system, the nationalization of the economy, primary economic reliance on 
agriculture, cultural separation from Europe, and a continued investment on every level in 
Tanzanian and African identities.66 It also crucially expressed a commitment to a national 
framework of human rights, to include the international norms expressed in Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and emphasized the importance of education.67 “Socialism and 
Rural Development” followed in 1968 and it outlined Nyerere’s understanding of African 
socialism as the utilization of indigenous African knowledge to embrace egalitarian social 
structures and avoid capitalist impulses. As Nyerere conceptualized it, this process would likely 
require a systemized embrace of structured villages theoretically based on family networks, the 
roots of the villagization process.68 However, despite its importance, “Socialism and Rural 
Development” was actually predated by the 1967 release of “Education for Self-Reliance.” In 
“Education for Self-Reliance,” Nyerere expanded on the idea of education as a human right by 
arguing that in fulfilling its obligation, Tanzanian public education needed to be egalitarian, 
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represent the educational needs dictated by the Tanzanian economic context, foster critical 
thinking, and impart the particular nature of Tanzanian society.69  
These concepts were a rebuke of the existing reality of education and assumed the right 
to education broadly. The idea that everyone should have equal access to education might seem 
simple, but it was a clear break from Tanzania’s educational past where the British used 
education as a tool to create a limited number of bureaucratic elite in “service of the colonial 
state.”70 This principle was also an expansion of the Arusha Document’s claim “that all human 
beings are equal” through education.71 Just as egalitarianism in education was the companion to 
complete human equality, a right to pragmatic education was a fulfillment of the socialist right to 
labor and the “just return” of that labor.72 Nyerere believed that agriculture was the only 
economic option for Tanzanians, so preparing them for agriculture was a fair fulfillment of the 
promise of labor rewarded with fair compensation.73 The responsibility of the state to use 
education in fostering critical thinking among its populace and not producing “robots” served to 
help ensure that every individual’s right to “take an equal part in government” was fulfilled on an 
intellectual level so that TANU and the Tanzanian could operate optimally.74 Finally, the 
utilization of pre-existing knowledge from elders and the spread of government mandated 
socialist ideology fulfilled a right of Tanzanians to be educated in a distinctively Tanzanian, 
distinctly African way, which partially based on what Nyerere saw as the pre-colonial African 
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pedagogy of education.75 Nyerere intended for education to serve the pragmatic needs of the 
Tanzanian people, and imagined a system of education that could accomplish that goal without 
compromising the state’s philosophical mandate to validate human rights, individual dignity, and 
African precolonial heritage.  
Early Cracks in the Right to Education 
Despite these sincere and progressive commitments, the limits of this understanding of 
education as a human right uniquely enabled by TANU should be easily apparent. Tanzanians’ 
individual ability to be educated outside of European standards might at first be liberating, but 
even the language of rights insured that the state had the sole authority to create a “Tanzanian” 
method of instruction. Tanzania as a cohesive identity was just recently constructed by state 
forces.  The centralized Tanzanian identity was meant to hide ethnic difference at the same time 
that it capitalized on precolonial heritage that predated the concept of Tanzania. The notion of 
including a precolonial African pedagogy seems laudable, but even as an ideal it involved 
flattening a diversity of varied African identities and traditions.76 This slippage can be 
symbolized by the use of Swahili as the language of instruction. 
 Swahili was not the colonial language of English and it represented a break from a 
previous form of oppression. However, it was also not a language widely spoken at home by 
most individuals in Tanzania, rather it was a regional lingua franca.77 It was an African language, 
but it was not an indigenous or culturally specific language like Chaga, Datooga, or Bemba. It 
was a different kind of externally enforced standard, but it was still an enforced standard. 
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Controlling what constituted an African tradition with ahistorical state projects was a later flaw 
of Tanzania’s Ujamaa Vilijini, and this tendency is not completely absent from education 
reforms. Education served other state purposes as well. Empirical data from the era suggests 
education was successful as a political tool. Students of government controlled schools were 
more than 20% less likely to have complaints about the state than similar students who attended 
private schools.78 The nature of state education naturally involves some form of internal 
propagandizing, and Tanzania was no exception. 
Cracks are also evident in the other expansions in the right to education made by Nyerere. 
There was a point past which the state did not want individuals to question the accepted socialist 
ideology, which makes it difficult to take completely seriously Nyerere’s claim that he wanted to 
grow questioning minds. A mind bounded by a strict ideological limit and centrally motivated to 
continually labor sounds quite familiar to the “robot” mentality Nyerere decried.79 This distaste 
for active dissent was not limited to a rebuke of groups considered regressive or opposed to 
wealth redistribution. It also included attempts by the state to mute radical student groups at the 
University of Dar es Salaam and the removal of the politically heterodox South African 
journalist Frene Ginwalla from her position as managing editor of the Tanzania Standard. 80 The 
choice to justify the right to education as a tool to fulfill a right to labor and just compensation 
for that labor was similarly concerning because it was rooted in an assumption that the needs for 
labor were simply what the government planned for. If the party and government’s economists 
and bureaucrats misinterpreted the economic possibilities of the state, like underestimating the 
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possibility of industrial growth, the nation’s right to fair labor and fair compensation would be 
abridged and the right to education would be rendered moot. Education became conditional on 
central planning. Finally, even Nyerere conceded that the fundamental egalitarianism of 
Tanzanian education was imperfect. “Only a few” Tanzanians would have the opportunity to 
attend secondary school under the existing economic circumstance and even fewer would be able 
to attend a university.81  
The Codification of Tanzania’s New Approach to Education 
Despite these limitations, “Education for Self-Reliance” was an ambitious project and 
soon became the basis for the next Tanzanian education law, the Education Act of 1969 which 
effectively made established party doctrine codified state regulations. The majority of the text of 
the Education Act of 1969 was concerned with creating legally enforceable definitions for 
categories like school and committee, but the Act’s most important impacts included resetting 
the baseline for Tanzanian education law, functionally nationalizing education, and re-structuring 
the process of governing education in Tanzania. The process of formally resetting Tanzanian 
education policy started with repealing the Education Ordinance in order to further excise 
vestigial colonial practices and to avoid contradictory definitions or guidance.82  The process of 
nationalization was perceived as an extension of this reset and was primarily comprised of the 
state taking over the operation of formally private mission schools.83  The takeover was 
implemented as an extension of the act’s stronger non-discriminatory admissions policy for 
schools and sought to address the marginalization of Muslim students who were excluded in 
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predominantly Christian areas without other educational opportunities. This prompted some 
discontent among Tanzanian priests and pastors, but secular education continued to be 
supplemented by religious groups and NGOS.84  
The act’s bureaucratic reorganization of the education system involved mandatory 
teacher certification, the establishment of Local Education Committees and the consolidation of 
the education system into the hands of the Minister of Education.85  The Assembly’s 
establishment of Local Education Committees was meant to create regionally accountable 
government body that drew from existing community leaders, and the consolidation of control 
under the Minister of Education was meant to clarify and reinforce a clear chain of state 
authority for education. Mandatory teacher certification was a secondary change intended to 
allow greater government oversight of teacher credentials. Across the board these reforms 
removed the remaining presence of colonial methods served as an attempt to make good on a real 
right to education, and ensured that the state had tighter control over every aspect of education in 
Tanzania. Viewed collectively, these reforms mirrored the contradictions between expanded state 
power and individual rights seen in Nyerere’s personal writings. In effect, the act was meant to 
begin making Nyerere’s theoretical writings codified policy. 
Education as Women’s Work 
 The 1969 Education Act also included, as the prominent Tanzanian politician and head 
of the TANU women’s organization Bibi Titi Mohammed was proud to note of the 1961 
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Education Ordinance, no separation between the education of girls and boys.86  As Titi 
Mohammed drew attention to, making no gendered distinction in Tanzanian education was a 
continuing rebuttal to both domestic norms and international methodologies which saw boys as 
more valuable than girls. Despite being only semi-literate herself, Titi Mohammed was one of 
many Tanzanian women who saw gender neutral education policies like the Education Act of 
1969 as part of ensuring that women were a part of Tanzania’s imagined egalitarian future. 87 Titi 
Mohammed had only a few years of any kind of formal schooling as a child both because of her 
gender and Islamic faith, but took advantage of basic literacy instruction as adult, a trend that 
was not uncommon among her demographic peers.88 The existing historiography suggests that, 
starting in the lead-up to independence and continuing into the era of independence, many 
working class women saw attaining education, for themselves and for their daughters, as a 
fulfillment of a trend towards greater autonomy.89  This new space for was fostered both by 
societal shifts, like the monetization of bride wealth, and personal ones, the death or divorce of a 
first husband.90  
This broad base of support for girl’s education was amplified by women in power.91 Bibi 
Titi Mohammed was the first woman to join TANU and, because of her success organizing 
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communities like beer brewers and dance club members, was one of the two or three most 
important political figures at the turn of Tanganyikan independence along with Kambona and 
Nyerere, but she not the only prominent women to hold political power and advocate for girl’s 
education.92 Unlike Titi Mohammed and her peers, Lucy Lameck came from a moderately well 
off Christian farming family and directly benefited from educational opportunities early on in 
life starting with a Catholic mission school.93 Her early involvement with TANU organizing 
resulted in her being sponsored to study briefly at Oxford just before independence.94 At 
independence, she was part of the first group of elected members of parliament andbecame the 
first woman in Tanzania to hold a ministerial post as Parliamentary Secretary of Cooperatives 
and Community Development. 
In that position, Lameck was part of overseeing and directing the majority of Tanzania’s 
adult education programs throughout the 1960s. One such program was an extended literacy 
campaign in the Singida region which counted 25,898 members of which 16, 162 were women.95 
In a follow up that Lameck would have likely reviewed, a Community Development Officer, 
Miss M.R. Jellicoe, described the possibility of expanding the program to more rural and 
decentralized Turu communities given the interest of the local women and potential UNESCO 
assistance.96 This liminal space between the Tanzanian state and international aid was another 
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important space where powerful women worked on spreading education. Lady Marion Chesham, 
an American born widow of a British expatriate farmer in Tanzania, was one such women and 
was actively involved in Tanzanian politics throughout early independence, serving as a member 
of parliament and a close friend of Julius Nyerere’s.97 Perhaps most importantly though, she set 
up, and briefly ran, the Community Development Trust Fund under the auspices of the Prime 
Minister’s office. The CDFT was a program that funneled assistance from external NGO’s into 
development projects in rural Tanzania, including significant investment into schools and adult 
literacy, and many development NGOs, like Oxfam, saw it as their primary planning partner in 
launching new projects.98 During Lady Chesham’s tenure, the CDFT often encouraged projects 
targeted at eliminating burdens on women based on the idea women would be the driving force 
behind community development if they were given knowledge, time, and opportunity. This 
gendered approach to development was well ahead of its time, and when Lady Chesham stepped 
down it was continued by the Tanzanian woman who replaced her, Martha Bulengo.99  
Unfortunately, even this active leadership and groundswell of popular support from 
women did not always directly translate to complete equity in education for boys and girls in 
Tanzania. As Tanzanian scholar Marjorie Mbilinyi documented in 1969, the ratio of girls 
enrolled in primary school to boys enrolled was approximately 1 to 1.598.100 In rural 
communities the ratio was even more lopsided at 1 to 1.77, though it dropped down to 1 to 1.22 
in urban areas. At the time, Mbilinyi conducted a study of the cause of this discrepancy between 
                                                          
97 Yoon, Mi Yung. "Special seats for women in the national legislature: The case of Tanzania." Africa Today 55, no. 1 
(2008): 61-86. 
98 Black, Maggie, 146, "A cause for our times." Oxfam: The first fifty years. Oxfam and Oxford University Press: 
Oxford (1992). 
99 Black, Maggie, 146- 148, "A cause for our times." Oxfam: The first fifty years. Oxfam and Oxford University Press: 
Oxford (1992). 
100 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library, Mbilinyi, Marjorie J. "The Education of Girls in 
Tanzania." Dar cs Salaam: Institute of (1969). 
34 
 
policy and practice which focused on interviewing fathers of school age girls enrolled in primary 
education and parents of girls who were not enrolled. She concluded that girls’ comparative 
under-enrollment was primarily linked to families’ reliance on school girls’ domestic work and 
the expectation that girls would get married in place of holding jobs.101 This patriarchal tendency 
to undervalue the formal learning and knowledge of women extended to the treatment of women 
field officers, agricultural assistants, and school teachers. In one such instance, the male principal 
of a farming school in Ukiriguru, one of four Ministry of Agricultural Training Institutes, noted 
to a World Bank researcher that men were often dismissive toward female field workers the 
school trained despite the fact women did more farm work than men in most households.102  
Such indignities and condescension’s were experienced by even the most powerful 
women. Less than three months after lauding the 1969 Education Act, Bibi Titi Mohammed was 
detained by the government for her connection to a possible coup attempt by Oscar Kambona. 
She was quickly convicted, and, despite a presidential pardon in 1972, never regained any of her 
former political or personal clout.103 Lucy Lameck avoided such intrigue, but despite a career of 
public service that did not end until 1992 with her death, she was never chosen for a higher 
position than Deputy Minister. Even the elderly Lady Chesham became a political liability 
before her death in 1973. Other party and government officials resented her close relationship 
with Julius Nyerere and repeatedly critiqued Nyerere for listening to the opinions and advice of a 
white woman.104 Post-independence education structures greatly reduced gendered disparities in 
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education and explicitly validated the equal claim of girls to the right to education. However, 
even radical pronouncements like the Arusha Declaration’s statement that “Women who live in 
the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania” or Nyerere’s comment that women were 
the mother of the nation framed women within traditional gender norms.105 To reap the benefits 
of education women not only had to grapple with the expanding power of the state, but the 
continuing presence of patriarchal cultural norms. 
Conclusion 
From the early independence movement through 1969, education played a key role in 
popularizing Tanganyikan claims to independence and was a central concern of both the 
Tanzanian leadership and general populace. At the outset of self-governance, TANU and the 
Tanganyikan state proactively committed to education as a right for all citizens, and eliminated 
the legal frameworks of discrimination based on racial, religious, and gender difference that had 
defined the sparse colonial systems. The resulting process of actually building the system of 
education that these legal changes mandated helped model the diversified range of development 
aid that Tanzania would come to rely on while also demonstrating the limitations caused by 
international agencies’ short time lines and primary interest in quantitative economic outcomes. 
Domestically, the first decade of independent rule was marked by a tentative socialist politics 
that had yet to be fully developed, but the political pamphlets written by Julius Nyerere provided 
some insight into the later egalitarian possibilities of Ujamaa as a political philosophy while also 
portending its tendencies towards coercive standardization. Education was as central to this 
increasingly radical project of African socialism as it had been to the independence movement, 
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and by 1969, Tanzania’s legal system quickly began to reflect TANU’s reinforced commitment 
to education as an uninfringeable right and as the expanding engine of long term state-led 
development. Women were instrumental to Tanzania’s state prioritization of education, and the 
number and percentage of girls and women enrolled in primary education and adult education 
increased significantly. However, this expansion of education was not enough to close the 
education gap between girls and boys, let alone the larger power inequalities between men and 
women. These initial successes and limitations of Tanzanian education foreshadowed the even 
larger accomplishments and missteps on the horizon as Nyrere led Tanzania into the 1970’s.  
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Chapter 2 
Common Knowledge: Teaching African Socialism 1969 to 1985  
The 1970s and early 80s serve as an inflection point in the history of Tanzanian 
education. Serving as both the halcyon days of expansion and the harbinger of downturn and 
austerity, this era is critical to understanding both the amazing successes of Tanzanian education 
and the contradictions that made it possible. By integrating human rights with appeals to 
economic development, Tanzania was able to channel local will while creating external political 
interest in education. There were limited alternatives, but the state’s proactive commitments were 
still noteworthy given the significant limitations Tanzania faced. Legal structures were less 
important in changing policy during this time period than they had been before. This partially 
reflected the fact that the foundation for the nation’s education system had already been set but 
was also a result of the more direct assimilation of TANU/CCM party politics into the functions 
of the Tanzanian state. With the escalation of socialism in 1969, the Tanzanian government 
became a vehicle for the ambitious possibilities, and catastrophic failures, of Nyerere’s Ujamaa. 
The period running from the early 1970s through the mid-1980s was as an era of enormous 
educational success for the Tanzanian state, both in accessibility and quality, which can also 
retrospectively be recognized as the beginning of a precipitous decline in the importance and 
provision of education in Tanzania. That decline was ironically caused, in part, by the same 
development oriented mindset that enabled the earlier successes, and exacerbated by other state 
commitments. 
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What Was Ujamaa 
The successes of the 1970s were not catalyzed by a spontaneous explosion of interest in 
education, though interest did rapidly expand. Through 1985, Tanzanian leaders, particularly 
Nyerere, understood Tanzania’s commitment to education as extending from the ideological 
frameworks described in “Ujamaa,” the Arusha Declaration, and Education for Self-Reliance, 
and TANU’s decision to double down on education expenditures stemmed from the party’s 
broader interest in bringing the goals of those texts to fruition. Unfortunately this connection 
complicates the clarity of interpreting the successes of education because. Both Ujamaa and the 
Arusha Declaration are better known as early blueprints, along with other documents like 
Socialism for Rural Development, for Ujamaa Vilijini, the harmful resettlement project that has 
come to define both the modern historiography of the Tanzanian state and Ujamaa as a political 
philosophy. Because of the historical and ideological importance of villagization, understanding 
any project undertaken by TANU or the Tanzanian state in the 1970’s includes reckoning with 
the ongoing failure of resettlement programs. This is particularly true because the spread of 
schools and adult learning programs in Tanzania were directly connected to the development 
funds Tanzania used to build the new Ujamaa villages. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the larger political project of Ujamaa was not just the 
collectivization of individuals into reconstituted village structures. It was a comprehensive 
politics of localized socialism developed primarily by Julius Nyerere as the party ideology of 
TANU. Influenced greatly by an early exposure to both Marx and egalitarian theology, Nyerere 
wanted Tanzania to follow socialist doctrine, but thought that most existing socialist models 
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could only function in European contexts.106  In Nyerere’s mind, this necessitated the creation of 
an African socialism that could account for the kinship networks and communal economies of 
precolonial and colonial African. The result was Ujamaa, a Swahili word that roughly translates 
as familyhood.107  According to Nyerere, under Ujamaa the state would combine the technical 
knowledge of modernity with precolonial communal economies. In the process, existing 
hierarchies of family and community would become extensions of the egalitarian socialist state 
and the economic development of the state would remain founded in agricultural production.108  
The primary impediments to this program were the aforementioned enemies of Tanzania: 
ignorance, disease, and poverty, and it was in relation to these enemies that Nyerere measured 
education.109 As discussed in the first chapter, Nyerere saw education as both normatively 
valuable and as necessary to spread new technical knowledge which would in turn make Ujamaa 
economically feasible. For Nyerere ignorance was an amorphous notion, generally referring to an 
uncritical lack of knowledge, and only a rigorous national education system that created self-
reflective and literate citizens could eradicate it.110 Education was also one of many tools, like 
new practices in agriculture and fairer distribution of wealth, needed to combat disease and 
national poverty. For Nyerere, villagization was a necessary part of structuring land in a way that 
was both socialist and accessible to state control, but education more directly addressed the 
issues of greatest concern under Ujamaa. However, the international aid community was 
enthralled with the development-oriented mandate of villagization, and Ujamaa’s political 
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complexity enabled a wide range of donors, which will be explored later. When party leaders 
began to actually force the resettlement of Tanzanian farmers and peasants into planned villages 
in 1973 they did so, in part, because of overwhelming international support, not in spite of 
international condemnation.111  
In order to more deeply understand the failure of resettlement, it is useful to build from 
James C. Scott’s interrogation of the process of villagization in the sixth chapter of his book 
Seeing Like a State. Scott’s particular criticisms are valuable both because they cut to the most 
damning assumption of Ujamaa and because his work is perhaps the most widely cited 
discussion of villagization.112 This is true to the point that his analysis has come to define 
Tanzania for many scholars. Scott’s narrative history of Tanzanian coercive resettlement starts 
with Nyerere’s decision in 1973 to make consolidated villagization mandatory. Resettlement had 
previously been voluntary since 1967.113 Nyerere asked that this mandate be enacted through 
village meetings and persuasion, but local official were still held accountable to ensuring 
resettlement actually occurred, so many interpreted this persuasive mandate loosely.  
As Scott recounts, this resulted in government coercion on the local level that extended 
burning down houses and making famine aid conditional on moving to government villages. 
When news of this violent coercion eventually reached Nyerere he emphatically restated that 
resettlement should be facilitated by dialogue, but he doubted the breadth of the problem and 
took no steps to make resettlement voluntary again before planned villagization was abandoned 
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in 1976.114 When Tanzanian farmers did eventually move to government villages they often 
found them poorly laid out and inattentive to the needs of actual residents. In some regions, 
village planners paid little consideration to water sources or soil fertility, and in most instances of 
resettlement, indigenous agricultural knowledge was completely ignored. Because of this 
ignorance of local agricultural specificities, government policies created an aesthetics of 
agricultural development that was incongruous with the destructive reality.115 As Scott points, 
the ecological failure of villagization directly mirrored earlier agricultural failures by British 
colonialists. He further argues that Nyerere and other leading Tanzanian were ultimately passive 
ideological actors, entranced by the high modernism of the World Bank and the United States 
Agency for International Development.116 
Scott’s description of planned villages under Ujamaa provides useful insights into the 
authoritarian tendencies of TANU leaders, but it also occasionally fails to capture the generative 
potential of Ujamaa by ignoring Tanzania’s political specificity. Two particularly valuable 
insights Sweet’s narrative tangentially provides, are that schools were often built in planned 
villages to encourage peasant movement and that these schools utilized democratic student 
governance systems, a program many Tanzanians lauded.117 Taken together these aspects of 
resettlement are a reminder that the Tanzanian state’s interest in expanded and innovative 
education opportunities was shared by the peasant population, but also complicates any attempt 
to disentangle the gains of education from the high modernist failures of resettlement. More 
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broadly, Sweet’s connection of the authoritarian coercion of resettlement to the state’s damaging 
reliance on development narratives from external aid benefactors demonstrates the erosive power 
of development discourse on rights in Tanzania.118 
Given the primacy of his writing, Scott’s sporadic lapses of political specificity and 
historical rigor also provide valuable insight into the limitations of judging Ujamaa solely by the 
failures of resettlement. Scott repeatedly equates Stalin and the Ethiopian Dergue with Tanzania 
under Ujamaa, while only passingly noting that the Tanzania state did not embrace the actively 
fatal coercion of either regime.119 Similarly, he briefly acknowledges that even during Ujamaa 
Nyerere and TANU remained popular among Tanzanian peasants, before declaring that this was 
also based in the distaste for colonial agricultural policies.120 Read together, these two attempts 
to minimize Tanzania’s difference effectively close off the academic space to read Ujamaa as a 
project negotiated within the limited space of poverty Cold War binaries. It also obfuscates any 
other desires of Tanzanian peasants outside opposition to resettlement despite citing Göran 
Hydén, whose work interrogates one aspect of that exact subject.121 This erasure of varied 
agency extends to actors within the state. In one instance, Scott argues that Nyerere’s preference 
for authoritarianism over organic peasant communities of was demonstrated by the closure of 
Ruvuma Development Association (RDA). This ignores that Nyerere referred to the leader of 
Ruvuma as the only true socialist and only conceded shutting down the project to keep party 
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loyalty in check.122 Understanding the overlapping interest of the Tanzanian state and populace 
in education is best facilitated by interpreting TANU’s interest in the provision of social services, 
like schooling, as at least partially sincere, and the dominance of Scott’s narrative of Tanzanian 
leaders as exclusively high modernist caricatures unnecessarily precludes that analysis.  
Rejecting the limited agency that Scott ascribes to Tanzanians does not mean discarding 
his critique of resettlement as part of Ujamaa. Even among more sympathetic audiences, the 
dominant scholarly interpretation of resettlement has been as a “noble social experiment” that 
turned into a “miserable failure.”123  It undeniably true that rural Tanzanian populace did not 
embrace initial voluntary relocations, and eventually nearly 6 million people were coercively 
relocated in some capacity.124  However, as Bonny Ibhawoh and J. I. Dibua have argued, Ujamaa 
is better understand as a discourse than as a set of policies.125 While some specific collectivist 
policies failed, much of the larger language of Ujamaa as shared socialist uplift remained 
popular. Education embodied Ujamaa’s popular socialist narrative that every citizen deserved a 
certain standard of life, to include literacy and useable skills for labor. In the Tanzanian case, 
unlike the Ethiopian Dergue, socialism actually provided an effective social good demanded by 
the populace.  Reviewing policies and proclamations of the 1970s, like the Musoma Declaration, 
begins illuminate the way in which the government saw education as essential to the official 
form of socialist and the extent to which education projects were embraced by Tanzanian 
peasants in ways other contemporary reforms were not. 
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A New Kind of Education Policy 
Outside of the shared discourse of Ujamaa, one way in which Tanzania education and 
villagization were linked was that both not explicitly guided by legislative acts. In both cases 
most important changes came from informal and formal policy around funding or external 
negotiation. Laws mostly served to affirm policies that were already occurring under ministerial 
departments and through party organs. At the implementation of the Arusha Decleration, TANU 
divided the entire country into units of 10 family cells, and the party perceived this structure of 
governance as filling in the state’s responsibility for state accountability.126  In 1973 TANU 
combined with the Zanzibari independence party to be renamed CCM. No document better 
represents the opaqueness of Tanzanian education policy formation during this new CCM 
Ujamaa period than the Musoma Resolution. Agreed upon in 1973, the Musoma Resolution was 
a TANU, which was renamed CCM party decision to radically move up the deadline for 
universal and compulsory primary education from the end of the 80s or beginning of the 90s to 
1979, just 6 years later. It also required all university students in Tanzania to serve two year of 
public service.127  
That declaration prompted some of the most rapid expansion of education in Tanzania, 
and the public service requirement was controversial among college students. Aside from the 
Arusha Declaration, and Education for Self-Reliance, few document from the Ujamaa era are 
more referenced or discussed by scholars interested in Tanzanian education than the Musoma 
Resolution.128 However, it was not a law so it did not appear in the National Gazette and it was 
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not widely discussed by name in contemporary newspapers.129 While the Arusha Declaration, 
and to a lesser extent “Education for Self-Reliance”, are common knowledge among Tanzanians, 
the Musoma Declaration is not only rarely discussed, it is basically unheard of.130 This might 
partially be attributed to the fact that it is almost impossible to find. Most of the academics 
discussing it cite secondary material, and essentially no copy is available outside of the National 
Archives.131 It is even frequently mistakenly referred to as having been drafted or voted on in 
1974. The centralized logic of state control did not prevent Tanzania from remaining committed 
to education, but it did undermine transparency already eroded by the shrinking voice of political 
voices that were not Nyerere.  
New Leadership and the Increasingly Rapid Expansion of Education 
Tanzanian leadership was not limited to Nyerere in the 1970s, but it is true that many of 
the other leading figures of early independence fell out from prominence. Oscar Kambona and 
Bibi Titi Mohammed were political outcasts, Lady Chesham died, and even Lucy Lameck lost 
her seat in 1970 and did not regain it until 1975. As a result, a new generation of leaders began to 
appear that did not have popularity or external constituencies separate from their position within 
the state. As a result there were fewer prominent political voices outside education, and this trend 
extended to education. While Oscar Kambona was technically the first Minister of Education 
during 1961, Solomon Eliufoo took over the position in 1962.  Eliufoo was originally chosen for 
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the cabinet because he was perceived as one the most popular moderate Tanganyikan leaders, 
and prior to joining the government he had served as education secretary of the Lutheran 
Church.132  Eliufoo served as Minister of Education for most of the 1960’s, and he defined the 
role more than any other following Education Minister.133 He was both popular and effective and 
his name became a mainstay in East African newspaper headlines documenting his strong tack 
with teachers unions, his travel to newly built schools, and the exponential increase in Tanzania’s 
education enrollment.134 However, at the turn of the decade Eliufoo suffered a stroke and stepped 
down as Minister of Education to be replaced by C.J. Mgonja.135  
C.J. Mgonja would be a less vital part of Tanzania’s education history, but he took over 
the Ministry at an inflection point of scale. Education was still be a priority in Tanzania, but the 
days of steady incremental growth through a modified version of the colonial model were now 
gone. In its place, TANU planned to spend the next decade expanding a radical vision of 
education as a truly universal right and as an economic building block of African socialism. In 
fact, Mgonja’s first major speech was an introduction of the second five year development plan 
for education. Eliufoo had led through first five year cycle starting in 1964, but this second 
iteration was more than a bureaucratic report, it was a blueprint for the future. Even the more 
moderate Eliufoo, who had led the Ministry of Education while the report was being written, 
hoped that it would solidify education as “a cementing matrix of Ujamaa and progress.” 136In 
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Mgonja’s word, the 60s had been spent creating most of the basic foundational infrastructure 
needed to create and run a multiracial national education system, but the 70s would be spent 
transforming Tanzania’s “entire educational system into a powerful instrument of socialist 
development.”137 The old report had been called “A Plan for Consolidation” while the second 
was named “A Plan for Revolutionary Change.”138 Mgonja was a somewhat important member 
of parliament, but this shift in discourse obviously owed much to Nyerere. Mgonja admitted as 
much saying that the policies contained in the plan were meant to create the ideal Tanzanian 
education system as it had “been explained to us by the Father of our Nation.”139 Even when 
espousing the value of education in a Tanzanian socialist state where supposedly anyone’s voice 
could be heard, it was important to make sure that President Nyerere’s voice was heard the 
loudest.  
 The actual proposals of the document were no less revolutionary than the rhetorical 
flourishes in Mgonja’s speech announcing it like: “Education for All is a basic socialist principle, 
and no expense should be spared to bring it about in increasing measure.”140 Insuring that the 
country was on track to achieve Universal Primary Education was named as the plan’s first 
priority, despite that it could more than double the government’s education budge. However the 
development plan for education was not limited to primary school enrollment. The complete list 
of 19 core objectives were a wide range of ambitious projects. For example, the plan outlined a 
road to doubling the number of teachers receiving certification each year to 2,850, but it also 
included a mandate to create Faculties of Medicine and Engineering at the University of Dar es 
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Salaam.141 The basic resources required for primary education were created, but this did not take 
away from Nyerere’s belief that the university needed to be expanded to address the “particular 
and urgent problems” of Tanzania.142 Similarly, primary schools would become “people’s 
schools” that reflected the daily life of villages through newly rewritten syllabi, and 
simultaneously adult literacy classes would also be expanded due to “popular demand.”143  
Every aspect of education was slated for growth and expansion in the report and 
education itself would be asked to do more. On one hand subjects which “play[ed] a part in 
development” would be given preference and a second technical college would be set up in 
Tanzania to encourage skilled laborers, but on the other hand national culture was to be fostered 
by the creation of museums and adult lessons were to include political and social education.144 
This surprising utilization of culture in the face of economic had two roots, outside of the direct 
connection to Ujamaa. Literacy is an iterative process, and policy makers hoped that cultural 
materials would keep Tanzanians engaged with reading. This aim would be reinforced in 1972 
with the launch of program to create regional libraries.145 The other value of spreading cultural 
goods stemmed was, as Laura Fair has theorized about drive-in theatres in Dar es Salaam during 
the same period, the validation socialism’s ability to provide an enjoyable life.146 Though not 
explicitly stated in this document, the implication of the report was that education was the 
answer to any social or economic ills that might face Tanzania, and the government intended to 
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treat education appropriately as a cure all. All that this commitment to education as a right and as 
an economic duty would cost was hundreds of millions of shillings the government didn’t have 
and the voluntary commitment of the Tanzanian people to building much of the actual physical 
groundwork. Unlike the case of villagization, Tanzanian citizens bought in. It was also here, at 
the point of funding and individual construction programs, that external actors would get further 
involved in Tanzania’s newly “decolonized” education system.147 
International Plaudits and Dollars 
Despite some skepticism about the feasibility of Tanzania’s goals, aid organizations 
latched on to Tanzania as an exemplary nation. This embrace was the result of a wide range of 
influences, but it started from the very top. While Nyerere was solidifying deific status in his 
own country, he also parlayed his charisma and intelligence into a sterling international 
reputation. When American newspapers, particularly African-American newspapers, discussed 
Tanzania they invariably mentioned Nyerere, an embodiment of black excellence and the 
capacity of black people for self-rule.148 The American President Jimmy Carter called him 
“the man who has the best insight into African problems of anyone I've ever met.”149 When 
international aid reports summarized the governance structure of Tanzania a laudatory sentence 
or two was always saved for Nyerere who was as “masterful an author as he [was] a political 
theoretician.”150 Nyerere used this popularity in particular as part of Tanzania’s participation in 
the Non-Aligned movement, which he saw as an opportunity for postcolonial autonomy. 
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Tanzania did not commit to the Soviet bloc or the United States, and the state shared this non-
affiliation as part of a broader coalition of non-aligned states, many of whom shared a similar 
development and nationalist oriented socialist politics.151  
Because of this lack of clear political affiliation, Tanzania had much greater autonomy in 
accepting aid from a wide range of actors than many other poor nations who were reliant on a 
single set of factional allies. In contrast, the Tanzanian state could feasibly accept Peace Corp 
volunteers, draw on Cuban expertise, partner with China on agricultural funding, and continue to 
receive money from the United Kingdom.152 This resulted in a wide range of external aid 
partners, all of which were finically critical given the both Tanzania’s poverty and the 
ambitiousness of the State’s projects. As mentioned above, Tanzania was one of the earliest and 
closest partners of emerging development NGO’s like Oxfam. This close partnership with NGOs 
extended to the, often underestimated, development resources of religious aid organizations. 
Nyerere was a devout Catholic, and many progressive Christian leaders saw the Arusha 
Declaration as the almost divine forefront of a new kind of Christian Socialism.153  By 1980, 
Catholic Relief Services alone was operating 33 ongoing projects directly connected to 
Ujamaa.154 Among Islamic leaders and aid networks, the Aga Khan led a stream of aid towards 
building new schools.155 Perhaps most impressive of these multilateral relationships, it was 
Tanzania’s approach to agricultural education that convinced the religiously World Bank to 
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begin funding education projects in the late 60’s, and it was also Tanzania’s expansion of those 
projects under Ujamaa that convinced the World Bank to expand their funding policies to include 
assistance with training.156 On a less groundbreaking scale, Tanzania was also able to draw on 
America’s USAID resources throughout Ujamaa despite Nyerere’s repeated critiques of 
American policy.157 
In spite of Tanzania’s increasingly socialist politics speaking the language of 
development opened up significant investment from even conservative aid agencies. For nations 
more sympathetic to socialism, especially wealthy Nordic Countries, Tanzania’s development 
project was even more appealing. Through 1979 Tanzania received 15.9% of Norway’s total 
development aid and was Norway’s most significant aid partnership. Sweden’s development 
agency, SIDA, was similarly generous, and through 1990 Tanzania received 15.3% of all 
Swedish aid.158 SIDA was particularly important to Tanzania because Sweden actively sought to 
avoid neocolonial power structures early on in its aid dispersal and was also especially invested 
in a tradition of supporting egalitarian projects targeted at the rural poor. When Tanzanian 
development coordinators were given a comparatively high amount of autonomy in deciding 
where Swedish aid went, they directed vast majority funding to education. At one point this aid 
was as much as a third of Tanzania’s total education budget.159 Further to the political left, China 
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was a particularly close ideological ally of Tanzania’s, and provided almost entirely 
unconditional aid to the state broadly in the form of grants and loans.160 The Soviet Union’s 
development programs were less transparent so it is difficult to interpret the scope of their 
giving, but it is clear that Tanzania received development assistance from the Soviet bloc.161 
This unique depth and range in development aid partners provides several insights into 
the operation of Tanzanian education. By side stepping much of the most explicit political 
segregation of the Cold War, Tanzania was able to harness resources that far outstripped its 
reputation as one of the 25 poorest and least developed countries in the world.162 Without a clear 
linkage of education to development, there is little chance Tanzania would have had access to 
even a fraction of those resources. Certainly, Tanzanian state’s programmatic commitment to 
education for all was a bold and drastic goal, and the perceived apolitical appeal of agricultural 
development and education was central to achieving it.  Education could be palatable as a step 
towards developing capitalist production for the United States, a fulfillment of peasant 
empowerment for the Soviets, and as a model for technical literacy training for World Bank 
bureaucrats.  
On the flip side, this wide range of actors all invested in Ujamaa with very different goals 
and only moderate long term commitments. The pull of international money weakened the 
reliance of the Tanzanian state on its populace for support, and required repeatedly negotiating 
the issue of nonnegotiable rights. This imbalanced power dynamic incentivized development 
workers to develop the kind of schooling and classes that international agencies thought would 
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be most useful, rather than what local Tanzanians were most interested in. As Marjorie Mblinyi 
noted with concern in 1976, the international aid community conceptualized poor countries as 
deserving lesser degrees of education.163 Tanzania’s reliance on development aid to grow 
education also meant that new projects had to be constantly launched, regardless of public 
interest. Donors had little to no interest in continuing programs in regions that already had adult 
literacy classes, technical colleges, or teacher training programs.164 The infrastructure 
maintenance was assumed to be taken over by the Tanzanian government leaving education 
development projects dangerously hollow in the long term.  
 Despite this top down aid strategy and the coercive bent of centralized government 
planning, by all accounts Tanzania’s commitment to education remained popular domestically. 
In fact this popularity was part of what motivated such substantive international investment in 
Tanzania. In explaining how “seriously” Tanzanians took education, one UNESCO worker 
described how even her cab driver knew the academic function of each building on University of 
Dar es Salaam’s campus and how education was treated by almost everyone she met as a form of 
“moral and material improvement.”165  Similarly, after returning to the U.S. one Peace Corp 
volunteer remarked how his Tanzanian students had been as “bright and hardworking” in their 
pursuit of education as any children he had met.166 These account are duplicated by the 
description of many other aid workers, and it was part of source of Tanzania’s perception as a 
unique space for education-oriented development. This broad support was convenient for 
Tanzanian government officials because broad popularity was also the party line of CCM. For 
                                                          
163 Marjorie Mbilinyi. "Basic education: Tool of liberation or exploitation?." Prospects 7, no. 4 (1977): 489-503. 
164 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Archives, Planning Non-Formal Education in Tanzania,  Jane 
K. Smith, UNESCO Report, 1967 
165 East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Archives, Planning Non-Formal Education in Tanzania,  Jane 
K. Smith, UNESCO Report, 1967 
166 Leonard Levitt, "Tanzania." New York Times (1923-Current File),1982. 
54 
 
the party, education proved the validity of a socialist system in which the needs and desires of 
the general population were reflected through the organ of the party and the legislature.167  
Local Voices and Written Words 
The importance of popular support for education started with the legal framework for 
creating schools. The easy process of incorporation of formerly private schools into the public 
system meant that many schools sprung up after local communities built them with the intention 
of having the government takeover operation.168 Even further, to some extent the bottom-up 
mindset had to be true for the entire system to function. Self-help programs, where local people 
contributed the labor for building a school or road, were financially necessary to make most 
construction possible, even for externally funded projects.169 A similar logic governed adult 
education learning.  Adult Education programs provided instruction for literacy, numeracy, and a 
wide range of specialized skills. They were part of a massive project that the government 
Community Development bureau spent hundreds of thousands of shillings and sparked some of 
the greatest external aid. However, the program still usually relied on the, often voluntary, work 
of students from local schools who taught many of the classes.170  In this sense, the massive scale 
of education programs, absent the sort of coercion seen in forced land reform, should serve as a 
degree of proof that education mattered to the general populace as much as it mattered to the 
party and government.171 The Tanzania Standard could proudly run headlines like “Moshi 
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Student Start Literacy Classes for over 2,000” or “ New Schools Built in Iringa with Self Help”  
daily because the population mobilized around a national vision that centered education as an 
engine of change and a platform for enabling dignity.172  
 The speeches of political officials and the taxi cab conversations of aid workers weren’t 
the only manifestation that the exponential growth in education Tanzania experiences was in part 
a project of the people. When asked, participants in expanding education programs were 
laudatory in their description of the comprehensive education scheme. Perhaps the most telling 
version of this is the interviews that were done with participants in Adult Education programs for 
projects like Yusuf O. Kassam’s  book examining the qualitative impact of  Tanzania’s education 
and literacy programs, “Illiterate No More: The Voice of New Literates from Tanzania.”173 It 
would make sense that adults whose education, or lack thereof, predated an independent 
Tanzania would express the most resistance to these new expensive high modernist education 
projects having lived their lives up to that point without the frills of formal education. However, 
this was not the case at all. In fact, not only did adult literacy campaign participants express a 
thriving interest in Tanzanian education, their justifications for it were very much in line with 
those of the government. 
 Like the Tanzanian government, the participants in adult literacy programs, Kassam 
estimated roughly 5.2 million individuals between 1972 and 1975, understood the expansion of 
education as both a way to improve their economic outcomes and to give themselves a greater 
sense of dignity and self-worth.174 Rather than fall back on economic justification, if anything 
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many of these individuals prioritized the enrichment of education and the way in which it 
provided them a conduit to greater understanding of their word more than the Tanzanian 
government or by an even greater margin external aid agencies. Yusufu Selemani was one such 
an individual, a coffee factory worker who had lived 43 kilometers from the nearest school as a 
child. Literacy did little to change his formal responsibilities or job prospects, outside of 
allowing him to sort labeled products by himself.175 What it did do was allow him to write letters 
to his wife, sign his own name, and help his children with their schoolwork. For him education 
used to only exist “somewhere faraway”, but literacy programs brought it to his home allowing 
him to, in his words, “feel liberated.”176  
From a similar background as Yusufu, Rukia Okashi was a peasant farmer who had 
slightly more practical inclination of wanting to read her own will in first participating in the 
literacy classes. However, over time she was able to read to her grandchildren, and reflect on the 
very nature of education, a good she used to believe only belonged “to a certain class of people”, 
changed for her177. She came to expect these programs not just for herself, but everyone she 
knew. Such endorsements were often supplemented by songs or notes that the literacy class 
participants where now able to write down for the first time. This tendency was pervasive 
enough that students could contribute stories or poems to publications like Hapa Leo: the Student 
Journal of The Institute of Adult Education in Mwanza.178 Less about literacy itself than an 
expression of adult learners new found skills, the journal includes stories about everything from 
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falling in love to a beloved flute. These stories were often quite touching, and they were a 
tangible expression of the non-economic value of education.179  
Programmatic success was not limited to adult education or qualitative metrics. The 
initial quantitative outcomes of both the tertiary and vocational expansions of Ujamaa were 
similarly impressive. Despite the new requirement from the Musoma Resolution that all college 
students first spend two years doing service for the nation, the high demand for higher education 
prompted the creation of new universities beyond the University of Dar es Salaam and new 
colleges at UDS.180 Many students were eager for the advanced educational prospects of tertiary 
instruction. This broad support for educational programs extended beyond the comparative elite 
at tertiary institutions to vocational programs as well. These were programs intended to teach 
workers new skills or practices. When surveyed, 95% of students who had attended vocational or 
trade schools reported being satisfied at their current job with 97% reporting believing they 
would not have received their positions without the technical training they received from the 
government. 181 85% of supervisors similarly agreed that vocational schools were training 
effective and skilled workers.182 Education was serving to both broaden Tanzanians perspectives 
and give them more diversified skills and opportunities for employment.  
The Hazy Outline of Success 
 The wide range of education projects in Tanzania under Ujamaa speak to the diversity of 
meanings that effective instruction can have, especially when the purpose of that instruction is 
differently interpreted by a diverse range of populations and actors. However, the most basic 
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goals of the state in education fundamentally came down to increasing primary school 
enrollment and literacy. These basic requirements, receiving formal instruction and learning how 
to read, also animated most demands from the Tanzanian public for education. Given the 
complication of disentangling other metrics like employment from unrelated external influences, 
it makes sense to primarily judge the quantitative success of Ujamaa education programs by the 
change in adult literacy and primary school enrollment. On face this should be easy given 
appropriate research. Regrettably, the standardized online databases managed by international 
institutions like UNESCO and the World Bank have little consistent information for either 
statistic before 1990, and even projects reports for individual literacy programs have almost no 
comparative data. The Ministry of Education sporadically published a report of basic facts about 
Tanzanian, and that publication includes an assertion that 79% of adults were literate by 1976 
with 4, 914, 634 adult learners and 3,518,183 primary school students enrolled in classes.183 
However, as Joel Samoff has discussed, the precision of those numbers obscures a significant 
margin of error. Samoff participated in the collection of education data during Ujamaa and 
documented the miscounts, best guesses, and gaps in knowledge that resulted in some schools 
being counted as half the actual size they were.184 Calculations of education as a percentage of 
state revenue were even more inaccurate, with a margin of error of 20%.185 
  Despite this imprecision, it is not impossible to get a broad picture of quantitative change 
over time by using both Samoff’s adjusted figures and the rates provided by other sources. In 
other literature, Samoff has estimated that between 1971 and 1981 school enrollment rose by 
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nearly 630% to roughly 3,600,000, and the percentage of students who were girls rose from 35% 
to 48%.186 Similarly his data states between 1971 and 1981 the number of adult learners rose 
from about 190,000 to 5,180,000.187 Other data from a comparative analysis of Tanzania and 
China estimates that percentage of Tanzanians over the age of 10 who were literate rose from 
roughly 29% at independence to a peak of 90% in the mid-1980s, and that primary school 
enrollment peeked in the early 1980s between 96%.188 For all these numbers there were more 
conservative and more aggressive projections, but the general trends, and scale of those trends, 
remains the same. Tanzania’s mass literacy project were wildly successful, and the resulting 
rates of literacy, gender equity, and school participation were a significant outlier among African 
state. Despite the failures of villagization, Tanzanian education development was a global model. 
The nation’s adult education programs even won the world’s only award for literacy programs, 
the Nadezhda K. Krupskaya literacy prize, from UNESCO in 1973.189 The corrosive effects of 
foreign aid and programs of state intimidation notwithstanding, Tanzania’s education efforts 
succeeded wildly by even the most unforgiving standards.  
Financial Crash 
Unfortunately, these outcomes were not spontaneously generated, and required constant 
expenditure far above Tanzania’s own resources. As the very first UNESCO report on 
Tanzania’s education system had foreshadowed, by 1979 an amount roughly equivalent to 
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Tanzania’s entire tax revenue was being spent on education.190 This budget squeeze was 
aggressively exacerbated by a 1978 war with Idid Amin and Uganda, which cost the state 
roughly $67 million, and severe droughts which were exacerbated by the existing instability in 
Tanzania’s agricultural system caused by villagization.191 The financial pinch lead Nyerere to 
address the parliament rather somberly in a 1980 address titled “A Time of Struggle.”192 In it 
Nyerere acknowledged that Tanzania was facing a financial crunch, but he called on the 
legislature to consider the moment an opportunity. He also rebuked the international doublet that 
Tanzania was forced into in which both the USSR and the US saw any action by the Tanzanian 
state in its own development interest in terms “of their own hostility.”193 Reinforcing his 
reputation for pragmatic idealism, he acknowledged the weight of the country’s poverty, but 
urged collective strength and unity.  
Unfortunately, unity was not enough to overcome the simultaneous global oil crisis, and 
African commodity crisis, that further plummeted Tanzania’s already weakened purchasing 
power and increased the larger economic malaise.194 Originally, Nyerere had planned to step 
down in 1980, but he promised party leaders that he would stay on through the economic 
downturn. Two years later, addressing the CCM party Nyerere acknowledged the escalation of 
the problem but nonetheless assured those in attendance that Tanzania would avoid the 
sovereignty crushing effects of structural adjustment.195 Unfortunately, the economic stagnation 
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became a continual crisis, and in 1985 Nyerere stepped down without not completely exiting the 
power structure of the part. His decision not to run for president signaled the end of a Tanzanian 
state with the political power to commit to education in spite of financial contradictions. 
Nyerere’s Legacy of Education 
Upon reaching this inglorious, though end of his political career, Nyerere was less 
ambitious in his description of the scope of Tanzania’s right to education, but he remained 
largely committed to the basic principles he had always articulated. In a Harvard Educational 
Review article published as he stepped down as president, he restated his belief in the importance 
of educational egalitarianism stating “education is the right of all citizens and not something 
which should only be provided for a plutocratic elite or as a form of charity for the poor.”196 In 
the piece, Nyerere continues to make reference to the value to a practical education noting that 
Tanzania was continuing to invest in “technical education” despite an instructor shortage.197 He 
also widely discussed the importance of the economy in determining a countries educational 
outputs. More a defense than an apologia, the article served in some places as an explanation for 
the ways in which Tanzania’s education program struggled.  
Mostly though, Nyerere felt the need to defend himself, and to a lesser extent Tanzania, 
to the world. He retrospectively summarized the foundation of his approach somewhat charitably 
as: 
“first, that every human being is fundamentally of equal worth and has equal rights; second, that 
the individual becomes meaningful to him or herself and to others only as a member of society; 
and third, that basic literacy and numeracy liberate the human personality, and are thus valuable 
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in their own right quite apart from the contribution that literacy and numeracy make to the 
nation's economy and to the individual's economic situation.”198 
He further lauded the complete revision of school syllabi to order to reflect the party 
doctrine of “Education for Self-Reliance” and create a Tanzanian identity with a specific “social, 
political, and economic character.”199 Nyerere even referenced the critical thinking engendered 
by this education describing Tanzanians as an “aware people” continuing to ignore the implicit 
contradiction in a nation guided by critical thought and completely united behind a singular 
ideology.200 In light of the available evidence, Nyerere’s cumulative legacy includes the radical 
reimagining of both the limits and possibilities of the human right to education. It is telling that 
the policy of independence and Ujamaa that Nyerere sought to highlight as he left office was 
universal education. However, the poignancy of the Harvard Education Review article also lays 
in the fact that as Julius Nyerere was writing it Tanzania was moving further and further away 
from the policies. 
Conclusion 
Nyerere’s decision to step down from the presidency did little to staunch the rising tide of 
economic downturn and resulting deconstruction of public goods. Within two years Tanzania 
signed a structural adjustment agreement with the IMF that reinforced the changes it had already 
been forced to make. As Tanzania’s budget crumbled donors pulled out of funding new 
programs. No money had been committed for upkeep of the education system under most of 
these aid relationships so the crisis in education was even worse. Schools had to be shuttered, the 
crisis in teacher pay deepened, and, even by the conservative measurements of the World Bank, 
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literacy rates and school enrollment precipitously dropped.201 As the international community 
condemned the failures of Tanzania to act responsibly a new future for the Tanzanian education 
system began to be developed. Unlike the early independence education systems these externally 
imposed reforms would challenge the very ideological grounding of education as a right and 
would posit economic austerity as the only acceptable parameter for the education system.  
Internationally, the failure of Tanzania education projects, and the Tanzanian 
Government broadly, to maintain sustainability was ascribed to the irresponsible spending habits 
of the Tanzanian legislature. Left un-critiqued, were the funding structures of aid organizations, 
the political pressures exacted on accepting certain kinds of assistance, the failure of the global 
security community to prevent the funding atrocities of Idi Amin and the international systems of 
economic inequality that had been partially propagated during colonialism and continuously 
attacked by the Tanzanian government and people. The failures of Tanzania’s development 
partners were particularly egregious. The early 1980’s marked a rapid shift to explicitly market 
oriented neoliberalism in the international aid community.202 As a result, organizations like the 
World Bank and USAID ended up actively critiquing Tanzania for failed villagization schemes 
which they had been directly involved in planning, and USAID even withheld all aid from 
Tanzania from 1982 to 1986.203  
This betrayal would end up providing ammunition for many of Tanzania’s external 
conservative critics, who were already beginning to frame the project of Ujamaa as just a violent 
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program of resettlement. This captures part of Tanzanian state behavior, but it also erases the 
historical complexity of Ujamaa. During the 1970s, the state’s commitment to extended 
development projects was more successful at bringing in funding for projects supported by the 
populace than all other available alternatives. Led by a popular president, the government was 
able to continue to achieve unprecedented educational successes in literacy, school enrollment, 
and gender equity that directly responded to concerns that Tanzanian peasants had raised since 
the 1940s. The state’s growing disregard for individual autonomy betrayed CCM’s commitment 
to human rights, but this disregard was not the reason that Tanzania was forced to agree to 
structural adjustment. Tanzania’s next education system would come not only complicate the 
relationship of Tanzania with high modernism and narratives of rights, but would also come to 
illuminate the impossible balance that TANU/CCM’s earlier successes had been based on. 
Perhaps most dangerously the simplistic narrative of state irresponsibility would come to define 
both the local and international conscious. 
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Chapter 3 
Too Cool for School: Tearing Down Learning 1985-2002 
When Julius Nyerere stepped down as President of Tanzania in 1985 after leading the 
country since independence, his influence did not suddenly dissipate. He was Chairman of the 
ruling party for 5 more years until he voluntarily stepped down in 1990, and his mythos remain 
central to Tanzanian politics. However, the end of his presidency did in some ways mark the end 
of a specific kind of national dream. Since the 1950s, Nyerere had led the chorus of Tanzanian 
voices demanding more for the nation from the international community.  It was also his vision 
that guided the state’s radical determination after the Arusha Declaration. He had been part of 
securing a free and unified Tanzania, and it was his writing that formed the backbone of the 
Tanzanian government’s promise to provide a just and prosperous state for its people.   
In spite of this, Nyerere’s presidential retirement was obviously far from triumphant. 
Endogenously, the rapid expansion of government power since 1967 had engendered wide 
spread corruption among public officials.  Parastatal industries struggled with extreme 
inefficiency and the villagization projects of Ujama failed to deliver on its promise of economic 
prosperity even after requiring forced migration and mandatory communal labor.204  
Internationally Tanzania had only come more fully under the yolk of global finance during the 
financial hardship of recent years but did not receive the same level of compensation for this 
sacrifice of sovereignty as it had before. The TANU/CCM promise of an autonomous, 
prosperous, and socialist Tanzania was ebbing as its most powerful proponent stepped down. 
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From Nyerere’s retirement through the new millennium, liberalizing reforms continued the 
treatment of education as a location of development policy, but failed to capitalize on the earlier 
successes that stemmed from affirmatively providing education as a right.   
The Beginning of Tanzania After Ujamaa 
In some ways, the era of Tanzanian politics after Ujamaa only symbolically started with 
the end of Mwalimu Nyerere’s term. Despite his deep opposition to structural adjustment and the 
IMF’s financial coercion, six years of protracted negotiations with the IMF had convinced 
Nyerere to begin the process of slowly devaluing the Tanzanian shilling and allowing the 
expansion of private businesses.205 Nevertheless, the transition of presidential power still rapidly 
accelerated the process of disinvestment from the socialist state. This was particularly true 
because Julius Nyerere’s immediate successor as president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, was most 
notable for his aggressively hands off approach to governance.206 His accommodating attitude, 
and general disinterest in ideology, starkly contrasted with Nyerere’s obstinacy, and he seems to 
have had few personal objections to economic neoliberalism. These differences, coupled with the 
increasingly dire financial position of the government, greatly facilitated Tanzania’s acceptance 
of the IMF’s proposed structural adjustment program in 1986. As originally written, the 
agreement required the Tanzanian government to devalue the shilling by 53%, deregulate and 
privatize industry, and reduce government expenditures.207 During the following nine years 
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Mwinyi enacted these policies while encouraging a general culture of permissiveness that 
facilitated free trade but also encourage growing corruption.208  
This impacts of this new neoliberal reality were particularly pronounced in the case of 
education. During the severe economic downturn the Tanzanian education system began to fail 
as both an end unto itself and as tool of economic stimulation. Foreign aid fell by 40% between 
1981 and 1985 alone, and a corresponding drop in education expenditure left the promise of 
education as a universal right unfulfilled.209 Poor workforce prospects left many of those who did 
receive an education without a way to support themselves, throwing the value of education as 
even a tool of development into doubt.  Under Mwinyi, this disinvestment developed into a 
spiraling feedback loop. Educational outcomes grew worse and worse as external funders 
withdrew because they were concerned about diminishing educational outcomes like falling 
secondary school enrollment and low quality teachers.210 The lauded literacy programs, 
innovative schools, and broad national interest in education that partially defined Tanzania under 
Ujamaa were subtly ignored and eventually forgotten by foreign actors.  Under the new 
discourse of neoliberal development, Tanzania could barely be considered a modern nation 
hamstrung as it had been by the toxic ideology of Ujamaa which was comprised of the worst 
features of “East and West.”211 In the eyes of the IMF, the future of Tanzanian education needed 
to primarily focus on mitigating expenses rather than building on the successes of the past.  
The implicit directive to abandon the ideal of universal education litters external 
governmental reports about Tanzania from the era, couched in bureaucratic language. One 1990 
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World Bank report summarized this view obliquely by stating that Tanzania’s “quantitative 
policy objectives are incompatible with efficiency ones.”212 “Quantitative policy objectives” in 
this context were all numerical indicators of success used in the past, like literacy rates and gross 
student enrollment. In contrast, the efficiency goal was maximizing the financial return on 
investments in education. Efficiency was the paramount aim of structural adjustment so the 
implied solution to this conflict was abandoning most quantitative goals. Rephrased, the report 
argued that in order to make education’s return on investment higher the Tanzanian government 
needed to move past attempting to provide education for everyone.  
The logic implicit in this kind of argument not only suggested that education as a right 
and tool of development were incompatible, but that, given the choice between the two, 
education should only be used in so far as it served economic development. In the same vein, a 
World Bank paper from 1996 celebrated the rise of the mean level of education in Tanzania. The 
fact that this increase came from increased secondary and tertiary education enrollment by 
wealthy Tanzanians, which hid falling enrollment fell among poor peasants, was treated as a 
secondary to the economic boons of mean education levels.213  Extrapolated, this language 
suggests universal programs in poor countries should not be not a moral imperative but a 
convenience purchased by wealth. The gradual expansion of education at slow, economy 
boosting, intervals in market-oriented states Kenya was presumed to be the preferable model. 
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Viewed in direct comparison though, the education outcomes of Kenya and every other explicitly 
capitalist African state failed to match that of Tanzania under Ujamaa.214  
Sadly, this comparative success in providing education had little meaning for an indebted 
nation in the late 1980s and 1990s. The rapid decline and fall of the USSR and capitulation of 
communist China to a qausi-capitalist economy left Tanzania without the ideological 
counterweights and diverse aid options that enabled its past politically heterodox success. Even 
Sweden, Tanzania’s closest development partner in providing primary adult literacy classes and 
universal education with, embraced the neoliberal trend in development, and made SIDA’s 
resources conditional on compliance with Bretton Wood norms.215 Any attempt by Mwinyi’s 
government to avoid austerity, even for education, was met with coercive aid freezes on all 
fronts.216 For Tanzanian state officials it became clearer and clearer that the global development 
aid was now both essentially unipolar and defined by liberalism. CCM’s past political balancing 
act was no longer possible. Political discourse in Tanzania was not completely stripped of its 
socialist roots, but the rhetoric markets, capital, and property rights began to gain greater 
purchase in comparison to the existing language of collective uplift.  The external pressure of 
structural adjustment and shifting domestic political dynamics made internal liberalization 
almost inevitable. From 1985 through 1995, the Tanzanian state held its first multi-Party 
elections, privatized state-held companies and rolled back almost all the remaining post-Arusha 
Declaration projects of the past decades. 217 As the wave of classic liberal reforms expanded, 
                                                          
214 Daniel N. Sifuna, "The challenge of increasing access and improving quality: An analysis of universal primary 
education interventions in Kenya and Tanzania since the 1970s." International Review of Education 53, no. 5-6 
(2007): 687-699. 
215 Bigsten, Arne, Ann-Sofie Isaksson, and Sven Tengstam. "The Changing Structure of Swedish Foreign Aid." (2016). 
216 Sebastian Edwards, Is Tanzania a success story? A long term analysis. No. w17764. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2012 
217 Liviga, Athumani J, "Economic and political liberalization in Tanzania and its unintended outcomes," Eastern 
Africa Social Science Research Review 27, no. 1 (2011): 1-31. 
70 
 
education in Tanzania was deprioritized and reimagined primarily as an economic investment 
rather than a state- supported human right.  
Local Liberalisms 
The discourse of responsibility that both catalyzed this shift away from Tanzania’s 
socialist universalism and prompted an emergence of market conscious initiatives started as an 
external pressure, but it connected to internal discontent in Tanzanian politics. In some cases this 
included a legitimate accounting of the policy failures. Under the harsh light of international 
scrutiny, the Tanzanian government was forced to admit that Ujamaa villagization and the 
consolidation of industry under the state had been at most “moderately successful”, and in many 
cases deeply catastrophic.218 Moreover, government leaders acknowledged many programs had 
been executed with highly variable levels of long term planning and a severe dearth of necessary 
technical knowledge.219  As with many modernist development programs, the state had 
erroneously assumed that large economic projects would eventually pay for themselves. At the 
time this self-assurance was only exacerbated by Ujamaa’s framing as a return to African 
tradition. Criticism was easily silenced for being insufficiently cognizant of Tanzania’s historical 
context or inadequately founded connected to Ujamaa.220 Before structural adjustment, 
supporting even the state’s most misguided programs, like forced resettlement, had become 
functionally necessary for proving that one was both sufficiently socialist and sufficiently 
African. This dogmatic tendency of the state was increasingly inescapable until economic 
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collapse destroyed the illusion that Tanzania development was inevitable.221 In one sense, liberal 
reforms created an opening to disentangle the growth of education from villagization. 
However, this increased space for dissent was not framed within any viable alternative 
political system that could provide the social services Tanzanians cared about. In fact, the 
structural adjustment program mandated that Tanzania shrink education expenses as part of 
reducing government spending in order to prompt economic growth and stability. That mandate 
made it clear that international aid agencies continued to understand education as tool of 
economic development and not as an unconditional right or even as a transactional social good. 
Absent international investment, the Tanzania state lacked the money necessary to grow, or even 
sustain, an education system that was created with the expectation of extensive external funding. 
Worse, without the guiding principle of Ujamaa, the government had no ideological reason to 
aggressively fund education if it was not directly generating economic growth, a fact the state 
seems to have recognized. Even as gross government spending significantly shrank under 
austerity education declined as a portion of the reduced government expenditure.222 Over the 
course of just 3 years starting in 1986 education dipped by around a third from 9% of total 
government capital expense to 6% and from 16% of recurrent expense to 12%.223  
. This decline in revenue contributed to poorly instructed teachers, overcrowded schools, 
and the general deterioration of Tanzanian education.224 At the same time that government 
expenditures fell the Ministry of Education utilized cost-cutting measures that infringed on the 
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reality of education as a right. This included instituting school fees for all levels of education and 
requiring that students purchase their own textbooks which made it more difficult for poorer 
students to attend school. As a result, primary education enrollment dropped by approximately 
67%.225 Similar fees were levied at the level of adult education, and the national literacy rate fell 
to roughly 60%.226 The government’s cost cutting measures also included further shifting the 
burden on school construction to local governments and communities and deepening 
development techniques of having students perform profitable labor, like growing food for sale 
at an agriculture focused secondary school.227   
The perception of education as fundamentally an economic value proposition had been 
part of the development framework of most external aid and development agencies since 1961 in 
Tanzania, but the state’s embrace of that position during austerity represented a rejection of the 
one social obligation that the state respected during even the most coercive periods of Ujamaa. 
During Ujmaa, lived policy reality was much more important than codified law, which was often 
functionally meaningless, and this remained true through the 1990s. It did not matter that 
parliament amended the constitution in 1988 to more fully incorporate a codified right to 
education, including language that not only gave individuals the right to education but mandated 
that the government fulfill that right.228 Financial reforms made education less accessible for 
most Tanzanian families, constitutional right or not. Ironically, cost saving measures still failed 
to meaningfully change the Ministry of Education’s financial situation. Fees were inconsistently 
taken up and students that did remain in school often simply failed to purchase textbooks. Local 
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communities were also already carrying almost all of the burden of school construction, and self-
reliance schemes at technical secondary institutions were only able to cover around 3% of the 
schools’ overall budget.229 Writ large, the Tanzanian state began to sell out education but failed 
to even turn a meaningful profit.  
The international aid community did no better than the Ministry at imagining a 
satisfactory education system that would not cost money, though not for a lack of trying. Some 
agencies and analysts argued for an increase in focused technical education which seemed to 
completely overlook that Tanzania both already had a robust number of schools for technical 
education and that those already existing schools struggled to match students with jobs in the 
industries for which they were nominally trained.230 Others more blatantly revealed their lack of 
concern about education for Tanzanians by suggesting the nation scale back the entire education 
system and refocus efforts on simply providing basic agricultural instruction. One pervasive 
argument put forward by an analyst from the World Bank suggested that perhaps the problem 
was that the government was spending too much on secondary education relative to primary 
education, which was more efficient since it taught laborers the bare necessities. 
 This ignored two important realities in Tanzania. The first was that Tanzania had built an 
education with a similar premise; primary education was meant as the universal and terminal 
education standard while secondary options existed for a small few given limited resources. The 
second is that when the government failed to fill an educational niche the private market filled it 
poorly. In 1986 only 0.1% primary school students went to private schools. Up to 53% of 
secondary school students attended private schools, which were both more expensive and often 
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of a worse quality, either in Tanzania or elsewhere in East Africa, but this was only done by 
those who were not accepted into the public system,.231 Ceding more grounds to these private 
institutions could have only served to undermine Tanzania’s commitment to egalitarianism while 
failing to improve the state of education.  
A Return to Form 1 
Post-Ujamaa economic torpor was not permanent, and eventually Tanzania began to 
reemerge with a stabilized economy rising from the country with the second lowest GNP to the 
18th lowest.232 As it did so, the government continued to reimagine its core civic functions 
throughout the mid-1990s. By about 1990 education began to slightly rebound, and by 1992 key 
figures like schoolgirl enrollment and graduation rate were marginally better than they had been 
during the middle of the crisis in the 1980s.233 The resulting stability of schooling, compared to 
storms of the economic collapse, and its particular social and political importance in Tanzania 
made formal education a clear target for liberalization advocates. New reform efforts reached 
crescendo with the creation and implementation of the 1995 Education and Training Policy 
which made gestures to Tanzania’s past successes but laid out a new ideological structures for 
understanding education in the future. Its bent was most efficiently summarized by President 
Mkapa when he tried to justify sharing the financial burden of education between citizens and 
the state during an interview that occurred just after he won Tanzania’s first multi-party 
presidential election. For the post-Nyerere era, Mkapa, the first Tanzanian president never to 
serve as a teacher, argued education was “a fundamental right but it is not so veryvery 
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fundamental.”234 This likely sounded eerily familiar to many Tanzanian’s who were already 
familiar with human rights that were not so veryvery fundamental.  
 Up until 1995, Tanzanian government had not officially changed education law in any 
meaningful way since the late 70’s at the onset of the economic collapse, so in a practical sense a 
revaluation of training and policy was arguably overdue. Read optimistically, many of the goals 
and changes outlined in the document were in line with the historical precedents set by the early 
independent Tanzanian and Tanganyikan governments. The introductory language of the text 
invoked the need to promote both “access and equity” as part of making education a basic right 
of all citizens, and this was mirrored throughout the text.235 Similarly altruistic goals like 
engendering a love of Tanzanian culture in its people, valuing human rights, and allowing for the 
proliferation of human dignity fill out much of the document’s 104 pages.236 Broadly, larger 
ideological aims that proliferated under the Arusha Declaration and Education for Self-Reliance 
were also mentioned and appraised positively. In this sense there was no significant rhetorical 
shift against the educational successes of Tanzania. Instead the Education and Training 
document was cast as a necessary update to enduring Tanzanian ideals.  
 This framing was also not entirely old rhetoric. As a holistic overview of Tanzania’s 
education system the Education and Training Policy document effectively touched on a variety 
of issues that needed to be addressed and also appropriately noted many of the existing non-
formalized mechanisms of training and education that existed for children, though it offered no 
suggestions for integrating them. Training and Education Policy document also suggested 
supplementing existing policies, like girls’ boarding, with new reforms like de-gendering school 
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material and hiring more women as teachers.237  It similarly addressed the need to promote and 
provide for education among underserved communities like remote pastoralists, the physically 
disabled, and orphans. This would require culturally specific instruction and in some cases 
specialized facilities.238 These new reforms also facilitated the incorporation of new global 
education movements into the Tanzanian main stream.  These international trends included 
screening for gifted and talented children, the implementation of food and wellness programs for 
students, and even the re-launch of trade schools.239 Unfortunately, very few of these valid 
concerns were intended to become public projects. The training document saw private schools as 
the key solution to gendered education inequities and programs for pastoralists and physically 
disabled people would have to wait until they were implemented by NGOs.240 Even gifted and 
talented screening and reimagined trade schools were symptomatic of larger structural changes 
inherited from the international zeitgeist through liberalization.241 
 While many of the goals and new focus areas of the Training and Education Policy 
directive were laudable, its central function was to reimagine education as a decentralized and 
privatized industry rather than the locus of transformative state social projects. Next to goals 
about access were mandates to imagine “education as an area of investment” and encourage 
private institutions to take on much of the work of education. Similarly, the documented 
“rationalize” universities to encourage the educations of “technologists”, and to broadly 
encourage the “liberalization of the provision of education.”242 This language of prioritizing 
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“rational” technologists mirrored global efforts to make universities financially profitable spaces 
instead of mixed-method locations of learning.243 While it did not include an explicit rebuke of 
early independence or Ujamaa education policies, the implicit argument made throughout the 
training and policy document was that the world of the 90s so completely precluded the state 
spending of the past that a new mind set should be expected. The proliferation of private schools 
should be encouraged, not prohibited, because they had the potential to alleviate some of the 
government’s costs.244 School fees should be reinstated because students understood that they 
needed to contribute financially to their education. NGOs should be considered long term 
caretakers of education rather than short term supplements in order to further remove 
responsibility from the national government’s hands.245  The devolution of education 
responsibilities to local governments that began during the crisis should not only be codified but 
also expanded. In short, the government needed to support education, but it should treat as an 
economic investment rather than a right or fundamental responsibility of the state.246 It was this 
mindset more than any other change that was most successfully encouraged by the passage of the 
training document. 
  While there was significant external pressure to further privatize education these reforms 
were generated and implemented by Tanzanian officials primarily from the ruling CCM party, 
which still has yet to lose a presidential election.247 The state’s reluctance to explicitly criticize 
policies of the past while effectively reversing their ideological roots likely stems from the 
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continuity of rule by CCM, which nominally retained its status as the party of the left. The 
leading opposition parties CHADEMA, literally referred to in English as The Liberal Party, and 
the United Democratic Party ran even further to the right on education, though they had little to 
say about it. The only recommendation for education suggested in a joint policy paper endorsed 
by both parties and published in 1996 by the Free Market Development Society was that it be 
“improved”, with no mechanism for improvement suggested.248 The justification given for 
improvement was that it would better enable “responsible citizens” to act as individuals in 
economic and intellectual free markets.249 Even the nation’s first multi-party elections were 
largely a referendum on the effectiveness of members of parliament individual clientalism, and 
Tanzanians were left without the opportunity to vote against liberalization in the education 
sector.  
Voices of Dissent 
 This shift in the ideology of education did not occur without dissent. As far back as the 
60s student radicals had charged aspects of Ujamaa era programs as being too dependent on 
Western liberal models of development in Cheche, a student-run Marxist journal.250 This fits into 
a larger history of leftist scholars, journalists, and politicians critiquing the Tanzanian state.251 
More direct critiques of the liberalization of education began in the late 80s as government 
officials first began to discuss a post-crisis system that continued some of the reforms of 
austerity.252  One early and powerful critique came from a conference of representatives of the 
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staffs of all of the tertiary institutions in Tanzania in April of 1990.253 This convention was 
meant as an official response of all of Tanzania’s academic staff organizations to a perceived 
increase in government authoritarianism under the economic crisis, but it had a separate value as 
a conceptualization of education Tanzania that was not predicated on the erosion of 
communitarian values or the reduction of state accountability and responsibility.  
  The document that emerged from that conference, “The Dar es Salaam Declaration on 
Academic Freedom and Social Responsibility of Academics”, was meant to reinforce what the 
assembled academic staff saw as the appropriate foundation upon which education should be 
built in contrast to the government’s failures. Because education was underfunded and 
overextended, the authors worried it was at risk of becoming “the preserve of the wealth and 
influential.”254 Education they argued should be a universal and equitable right that cultivated 
critical thought, a knowledge of the environment, and commitment to emancipation in every 
individual. This was not simply a hypothetical moral obligation of the state. The declaration 
argued that the state had an obligation to constitutionally mandate that a certain minimum 
portion of the government’s resources to all education, not just universities, while implementing 
affirmative policies that addressed historical inequalities.255 This was complimented by the 
responsibility of academic staff and institutions to work to solve “contemporary problems” and 
address historical injustices.256 While much of the rest of the deceleration’s language around 
freedom of speech and the rights of individuals to be democratically represented was coopted 
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into the discourse of new liberal parties, the expression of education as a fundamental right was 
largely ignored on all sides. To little surprise, no provision creating a mandatory constitutional 
minimum for education funds was passed. 
 The system created by state preference for the vision of Training and Education Policy 
document over the “The Dar es Salaam Declaration on Academic Freedom and Social 
Responsibility of Academics”  did not completely destroy Tanzania’s education system. It did, 
however, undermine the most historically continuous social obligation paid from the Tanzanian 
government to its people and create a structure far more likely to treat education as a market or 
good than a right. Decentralization and cost sharing where pitched as methods for creating 
community and individual buy in on education, but they were more honestly intended as an 
offshoring of financial liability for an expensive social program. Similarly the language of rights 
proliferated throughout the 1990s, but no additional protections were actually created to 
reinforce the system of responsibility the government ignored throughout the 1980s.257 Electoral 
politics offered no alternative because no party advocated for the social promises of the past, not 
even the party that made the original promises. There was little money to be made from socialist-
style public education, and in liberalized Tanzania partisan politics were also a marketplace.258 
Tanzania Education grew as Tanzania continued its economic rebound throughout the late 
nineties and into the early aughts, but it was built on a shaky foundation of a cobbled together 
coalition of NGOs, public funding, international aid, and private schools that replicated the least 
sustainable aspects of the Ujamaa era programs that crumbled under financial pressure. 
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 The late 90s saw no other significant structural changes to education outside of edits to 
the Training and Education Policy document and laws passed to further legislate the policies of 
the document. The most significant shift was a cultural one as the government grew more 
comfortable articulating education as an industry without any uncomfortable asides about its 
simultaneous importance as a right. The markers of this shift could soon be seen everywhere. 
When President Mkapa delivered a speech to the students and professors of the University of Dar 
es Salaam in 1999 he noted that his three priorities as president has been “the economy, the 
economy the economy!”259 He further argued that the only solution to a lack of funding in 
education was a better economy. When he discussed education as a social service in his address 
at the CCM party meetings in 2002 his only note on the issue was that it was important for 
Tanzanians to realize education was an economic investment.260 This comment can be 
interpreted quite literally, as the state-sponsored investment guide for 2002 listed education as an 
industry for investment. After assuring investors that total foreign ownership of education 
institutions in Tanzania was both was both “allowed and well accepted,” the investment guide 
suggested profitable areas for privatization or private investment including new for-profit 
schools, hectares of land earmarked for development by private dollars on the University of Dar 
es Salaams campus, and recreational businesses.261 The guide wrapped up by advertising the 
dwindling governmental budget for investment and the “conducive political environment” for 
investing in education.262   This language of government decline was also used by the 
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government when they justified a lack of data on children’s rights to the convention on the rights 
of the child as caused by the decentralization of Tanzania’s child policy. This suggests that while 
there was not an outright failure caused by liberalization, there was a loosening of accountability 
that circumvents the ability to identify failure.  
Conclusion 
In January of 2002 Tanzania implemented its next big education plan, the Primary 
Education Development Plan (PEDP).263 It was the first step in a government strategy to 
revitalize Tanzania’s education system and bring back the primary school enrollment and literacy 
rate successes of the 1970s.  It launched with a wide range of development partners and 
significant public support.264 It was considered important enough that it has since been 
erroneously described as an amendment to the Education Act. With Nyerere passing away in 
1999 it also represented the nation’s first completely post-Nyerere large education initiative. 
However, it did not substantially rewrite the educational strategies established in 1995 or rebuke 
the shift towards asset based evaluation of education.  PEDP is largely based on a shaky 
foundation of private industry and the same development agencies that funded much of the first 
wave of education expansion in Tanzania.  The primary ambition of PEDP was actually only to 
remove the school fees created during structural adjustment. It also does not even universally 
accomplish that.265 It remains to be seen how the liberalized education sector will handle an 
economic crisis on the scale of the 1980s. However, what is clear is that the Tanzanian 
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commitment to education has been eroded by the rising tide of the market economy washing 
away a promise of literacy and schooling that starts at least in the 1950s. 
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Conclusion 
Despite Tanzania’s early tradition of expanding education as a universal right, 
contemporary Tanzanian policy makers are not particularly different from other African 
bureaucrats in their approach to education. Some of the earliest achievements of independence, 
such as racially integrated education or choosing not to distinguish between a right to education 
for men and right to education for women, have since become norms expected in all countries. 
Other successes, such as the extensive network of adult education classes, largely faded stop with 
the end of radical Ujamaa. Education is less of a civic institution than a series of World Bank 
metrics used to demonstrate development, and the broader spectrum of civic space has started to 
shrink as well. In one sense this eventual acceptance of development norms is a reminder that the 
ultimate sovereignty of African countries often does not lie in the hands of state governments. 
An opaque global structure of political hegemony and financial capital ultimately dictates the 
acceptable limits of political expression in Africa. On a more clearly defined scale, the history of 
Tanzanian education demonstrates both how education can be undermined by the prioritization 
of liberal development and the way in which focusing on education provides can provide an 
alternative understanding of state capacity. 
Despite the deconstruction of successful Ujamaa era policies, it would be alarmist to 
describe Tanzania’s education system as completely failing in the contemporary moment. In late 
2015, the Tanzanian government expanded the 2002 partial eradication of primary school fees to 
secondary schools, and these legal expansions of education opportunities have been accompanied 
by improved metrics. Since the new millennium, primary school enrollment metrics have 
reached as high as 98%, matching and perhaps surpassing those of the 1970s. Literacy rates are 
also roughly comparable, if still lower, to those under Ujamaa, with the percentage of individuals 
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over the age of 15 able to read hovering in the high-70s.266 Education remains a priority for many 
law makers, and around 22% of Tanzania’s 2016-2017 budget went to funding education, though 
expenditure statistics are still fairly inaccurate.267 In a quantitative sense, the loftiest goals of 
education might not have been met, but by most metrics education is not performing 
significantly worse than it was under Education for Self-Reliance. However, the underlying 
fragility of contemporary education begins to come into focus when considering these change in 
the statistics over the last decade or so. Since 2006 secondary school enrollment rates have not 
risen above 40%, literacy rates have stagnated, and primary school enrollment rates have actually 
slowly but steadily declined.268 Put simply, even after almost thirty years of relative economic 
health and stability, neoliberal education reforms have yet to completely equal the education 
metrics of Ujamaa or match their upward trend. 
Development analysts and politicians have blamed this torpor on a variety of issues 
including the dearth of secondary schools in growing rural communities, remaining school costs 
like books and uniforms, and even the eradication of fees, which has only exacerbated the 
chronic underfunding of individual schools.269 All of these problems are at least partially rooted 
in Tanzania’s poverty, but most of them have existed in some form since the creation of a 
national education system. The inability of the state to utilize the successful solutions of the past 
stems from a larger lack of interest on the part of the national government in affirmatively 
advancing education as a universal right.  Celebrating the current stability would overlook that 
little to nothing has been done to protect public education from the possibility of future economic 
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downturn, or the increasing disinvestment of the government from the Tanzanian people. In 
education, this disinvestment has included both economic withdrawal, like failing to build 
schools in growing rural areas, and civic withdrawal, like President Magafuli’s recent decision to 
reverse existing policy norms and expel any school girls who become pregnant before 
graduating.270 Unfortunately, such disinvestment is not limited to education, and almost any 
aspect of the Tanzanian public sphere is now open for privatization and profit. Increasingly, 
individual consolidation of wealth has been encouraged and celebrated, corrupt resource 
extraction by foreign companies has become normalized at the highest levels of government, and 
dissent, even from journalists and intellectuals, is more dangerous than at most earlier moments 
in Tanzania’s history.271  
The long-established support for education in Tanzania suggest that there should floor to 
state withdrawal, but conceptualized solely as an economic good for economic development, 
education is more vulnerable than ever if it fails to provide adequate returns on investment. 
Outside the state, even the most democratic organizations are at constant risk of cooption. 
HakiElimu is one such institution, the leading Tanzanian education nonprofit, and its reports and 
analysis is actively sought out by members of parliament. Prominent intellectuals like Issa Shivji 
and Marjorie Mblinyi have distributed papers through their publishing arm and they have a well-
established reputation of trying to amplify both the needs of Tanzania collectively and the needs 
of individual marginal populations272. However, as the space for criticism grows smaller in 
Tanzania, the private sector offers no protection. Even as the most powerful advocates of a right 
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to education in Tanzania, HakiElimu is increasingly at risk of either eventual government 
retribution or the creep of self-censorship. Further many of the organization’s boldest leaders are 
part of the shrinking segment of the population old enough to understand personally the 
evolution of Tanzania’s education system. Smaller, younger NGOs are only more vulnerable to 
state coercion or cooption by moneyed interests. The expanding number of small private schools 
and for profit ventures are necessarily uninterested in visions of education that preclude profit. In 
all of the areas that the government has withdrawn from education, it has been replaced by actors 
unable to consistently recreate the obligations and accountability of the state over the long run. 
The fragility of education is not limited to Tanzania, though its particular transition from 
its former politics is among the most disheartening. Financial disinvestment, privatization, and a 
withdrawal of state accountability is undermining the stability of education systems across the 
globe. Tanzania lags far behind the prodigious financial expansion of the American school 
voucher movement where public funds pay for largely unregulated private schools, or even the 
internalized privatization of some Kenyan universities where smaller class sizes are available for 
a much higher price, essentially creating private universities within public ones.273 Globally, as 
scholars like Patricia Burch have argued, the transition from validating education as civic 
necessity to a source economic development ending in understanding education as a marketplace 
good has only accelerated.274 Historicizing the successes of the Tanzanian education system not 
only highlights how rights can be subsumed by development, but also how alternative 
interpretations of education and development might be possible.  
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Using the education system of Tanzania as a window into global histories of development 
or even as an alternative touchpoint to villagization for discussing Ujamaa does not necessitate 
ignoring more critical aspects of the existing historiography. Reading histories of African state 
projects generously does not mean reading them naively because the benefit of this kind of 
historical interrogation is not dependent on state purity. To the contrary, interrogating modernist 
projects of development that counterintuitively represented bottom-up interests is necessary in 
attempting to escape the most authoritarian tendencies of state power without accepting state 
neglect as the only alternative. Viewed this way, understanding the successes of education is not 
a rebuke of existing scholarship like James Scott’s analysis of the coercive misdeeds during 
Ujamaa villagization.275 Instead it advances that scholarship, by supplementing existing 
knowledge about why Tanzanians supported aspects of the Ujamaa state even as they resisted 
resettlement schemes. Hopefully this expansion not only demonstrates that education was treated 
as a fundamental right by the Tanzanian government but also helps map alternatives to the 
failing contemporary approach to education. 
This historicized approach towards Tanzania’s education system is not just necessary as 
correction to scholarly discourses. As Marie-Aude Fouéré, has demonstrated, the discourse of 
Ujamaa has reemerged in Tanzania as kind of political aesthetics of morality. Rather than 
serving as an inspiration to adventurous politics of egalitarianism however, or even as a warning 
about the dangers of development ideologies and modernist hubris, Ujamaa has been utilized, as 
a deflection of criticism of the state and depoliticized model of goodness.276 As is the case with 
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many issues tangentially connected to Tanzanian education, Marjorie Mblinyi has already 
modeled a more productive version of this complexity in her contribution to a recent collection 
on Nyerere’s legacy.277 As she points out, it is absolutely vital to highlight the explicitly people 
centered leadership and liberation that occurred under Ujamaa to combat an increasing disregard 
for the public will. Since before independence, before Tanzanian even existed as a political unit, 
Tanzanians have been demanding that the state provide literacy and formal schooling. The most 
ambitious and successful program that the independent Tanzania has implemented since then 
have all been stemmed from filling that demand and providing all Tanzanians education. In the 
process, the state both capitalized on and was corrupted by development and aid, but remained 
committed to the enrichment of the Tanzania. Reinvigorating this political project has not been 
more necessary since the early days of independence. After all, it was not so long ago that even 
the coercive Tanzanian state recognized education as very very fundamental.  
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